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INTRODUCTION
A lawyer who represents a capital defendant with a strong
innocence claim must allocate her resources between the separate
guilt and penalty phases1 of the capital case. Expending resources in
preparation for a penalty trial may result in less attention to securing
the acquittal on the capital charge at the guilt trial that would make
the penalty phase moot. But focusing primarily on proving the
defendant's innocence at the guilt trial means less preparation in the
case of a guilty verdict. Once a defendant is convicted of a capital
offense, a lawyer must also make strategic decisions about the penalty
phase. By focusing primarily on reasserting the defendant's claim of
innocence, she can seek to convince the jury that they should spare the
defendant because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt. Alternately,
she can accept the jury's verdict at the guilt stage and focus primarily
on introducing mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's
background to the j ury. In dealing with these critical strategic choices,
what should the lawyer do?
In Wiggins v. Smith,2 the Court held a capital defendant's
attorney's decision to focus solely on reasserting the defendant's claim
of innocence at the penalty trial to be ineffective assistance of
counsel.3 This decision demonstrated that capital defendants'
attorneys' decisions to focus primarily or exclusively on reasserting
defendants' claims of innocence at the penalty stages of capital trials
will not automatically be viewed as reasonable strategic choices. As I
will discuss below, the attorneys in Wiggins made some unusually

1. Capital cases are bifurcated: first, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty
of any of the offenses with which he is charged; then, if the jury has found the defendant
guilty of a capital offense, the jury decides whether the defendant will be sentenced to death
or a lesser punishment. Although the precise issues to be determined at the penalty trial vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the penalty jury invariably makes its sentencing
determination after considering aggravating factors introduced by the prosecution and
mitigating evidence introduced by the defense. See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating
Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 305, 306-07 (providing examples of capital-sentencing statutes).
2. 539 U.S. 510 (2003) .
3. Id. a t 535.
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questionable decisions, making it difficult to determine how to apply
the Court's holding to other fact patterns. To consider issues that arise
more frequently, it is useful to consider Ronnie Chandler's trial for
capital murder. Although Chandler's case is not necessarily typical,
the problems presented for Chandler's attorney in that case exemplify
some of the problems likely to be encountered by an attorney
representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence.
Near a small, rural lake in Piedmont, Alabama, Charles Jarrell
killed his brother-in-law, Marty Shuler, on May 8, 1990.4 In 1991 the
United States indicted David "Ronnie" Chandler for capital murder
under the federal death-penalty statute, claiming that Chandler was a
drug kingpin who had hired Jarrell to kill Shuler.5 Subsequently,
Chandler retained Drew Redden, an able and experienced criminal
defense attorney,6 to defend him at trial.7 Redden immediately began
preparing Chandler's case.8 After interviewing "at least 67 witnesses"
in the Piedmont area, Redden determined that the government's case
against Chandler was weak.9 He "actively pursued acquittal"10 at trial
and did not prepare for the penalty trial, which would only take place
if Chandler was convicted of the capital-murder charge.11
At trial, Jarrell, the government's chief witness, testified that
Chandler had offered him $500 to kill Shuler, whom Chandler
believed to be a police informant.1 2 Jarrell said that he accepted this
offer, received a gun from Chandler, and drove Shuler to Snow's
Lake, where the two engaged in target practice before Jarrell shot
Shuler twice, killing him.13 Jarrell claimed that he then met Chandler
and together they hauled "Shuler's body away for burial."14

4. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1310 ( 11th Cir. 2000).
5. Id.
6. At the time Chandler hired him, Redden had tried over 1000 cases. Id. at 1310 n.3. He
was a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and President of the Alabama Bar, a member of the
American College of Trial Lawyers and the International Society of Barristers, and listed in
A merica's Best Lawyers "for his criminal defense work" and described as " 'an extremely
talented defense counsel, probably the best in the state . . .'" Id. (quoting prosecutor).
.

7. Id. at 1310.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
1 1. See supra note 1 .
12. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
13. Bill Rankin, Seeking Justice on Death Row; Inmate Fights for Life After Testimony Is
Recanted in Federal Drug Kingpin Case, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 25, 1998, at Al4
[hereinafter Seeking Justice].
14. Id.
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Redden impeached Jarrell's testimony by showing he had made
several "inconsistent statements. "15 When first arrested, Jarrell stated
that he had not killed Shuler.16 Later he said that he accidentally shot
Shuler,17 and then that he had murdered him out of "personal
animosity."18 Finally, after receiving the government's promise that, in
exchange for his testimony, neither he nor his son would be
prosecuted for killing Shuler, 19 Jarrell implicated Chandler in the
murder.20
Redden also showed that Jarrell never received $500 from
Chandler21 and had consumed twenty-three beers just before shooting
Shuler.22 In addition, Redden presented evidence indicating Jarrell's
motive for killing Shuler. Shuler had married Jarrell's sister and
Redden introduced evidence showing that Jarrell was angry at Shuler
because he had been an abusive husband.23 Jarrell even admitted that
less than a year before he killed Shuler he had attempted to murder
his brother-in-law because of the escalating abuse. At that time, after
telling Shuler "he was going to kill him," he placed a "pistol against
Shuler's nose and pulled the trigger," but the gun did not fire.24 At
Chandler's trial, Jarrell told the jury that " ' [t]he Lord didn't intend
for [Shuler] to die that night.' " 2 5
Although the government's murder charge depended almost
entirely on Jarrell's testimony, the jury convicted Chandler of capital
murder, thus setting the stage for the penalty trial.26 The verdict
shocked Redden.27 He had expected an acquittal and had done
nothing "to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial."28 In a last
minute attempt to save his client's life, Redden asked "Chandler's
wife . . . to round up witnesses who could speak up for Chandler" at

15. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1311.
19. Rankin, supra note 13.
20. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1311.
21. Id. at 1310.
22. Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Bill Rankin, Pot Dealer May Be 1st Executed as 'Drug Kingpin,' ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Jan. 23, 1994, at Gl [Hereinafter Rankin, Pot Dealer].
26. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
27. Rankin, Pot Dealer, supra note 25.
28. Bill Rankin, Hard Times for Death Row Appeals?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 31,
2000, at lA.
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the penalty trial, which was to begin the following day.29 Extremely
distraught, she could identify only her preacher.30
.
At sentencing, Redden's primary argument was that the jury
should not impose the death sentence because of its lingering doubt as
to Chandler's guilt. He also noted the defendant had no prior
convictions and called his wife and mother to testify.31 In rebuttal, the
prosecutor reminded the jury that even Charles Manson and " 'Jack
the Ripper had a mother.' "32 The jury unanimously recommended
that Chandler "be sentenced to death. "33
Chandler later sought to vacate his death sentence on the ground
that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.34
Specifically, he claimed that Redden's representation was
unreasonable because he failed to "investigate and . . . present
character witnesses" at sentencing.35 Chandler's new attorney
presented twenty-seven witnesses who testified to numerous occasions
on which Chandler had assisted others in need of help. Martha Heath,
for example, testified that Chandler bought her son two new pairs of
shoes after seeing him running shoeless "around Piedmont's
projects."36 Elaine Freeman testified that Chandler gave her
neighbor's family money to pay for their son's burial when he died in
an auto accident.37 Jerry Masters testified that Chandler helped erect a
fellowship hall at [a] church and " 'didn't charge a penny.' "38 Others
testified that Chandler built a porch so a disabled man could enter and
exit his house, gave needy mothers bags of groceries, and donated
heavily to charities.39 Chandler claimed that Redden's failure to do the
investigation necessary to find these witnesses constituted deficient
performance, thus satisfying the first prong of Strickland v.
Washington's test for ineffective assistance of counsel.40

29. See Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1312.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. For other mitigating evidence presented at the hearing, see Chandler, 218 F.3d at
1312 n.8.
40. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court held that in order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show both that his attorney's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," id. at 688, and that the
defendant was "prejudiced" by his attorney's deficient performance, id. at 692.
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The Eleventh Circuit, in a 6-to-5 decision, rejected Chandler's
claim. The court concluded that "focusing on acquittal at trial and
then on residual doubt at sentencing (instead of other forms of
mitigation) can be reasonable . . . [e]specially when . . . the evidence of
guilt [is] not overwhelming. "41 Because the government did not
possess a strong case against Chandler, the court held that Redden
acted reasonably.4 2 His decision to vigorously seek an acquittal at the
expense of an investigation into mitigating evidence did not fall
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."43 The
court thus affirmed Chandler's death sentence.
After Chandler's death sentence was affirmed, Jarrell admitted
that his testimony at Chandler's trial had been false.44 Nevertheless,
Chandler's subsequent efforts to obtain relief from the courts have
been unsuccessful.45 In 2001, however, President Clinton commuted
his death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.46
Chandler's case has attracted substantial media attention because
of the doubts as to his guilt.47 Over the past decade, there have been a
surprisingly large number of cases in which defendants sentenced to
death have been exonerated.48 And stories like Chandler's may
suggest that the cases in which defendants on death row have been

41. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1327.
44.

Chandler Challenges Conviction, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 2001, at SC.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g. , American Justice: Marijuana and Murder (A&E television broadcast, Sept.
19, 2001) (recounting the events leading to Chandler's conviction as well as the important
events that followed - i.e., Jarrell's recantation, the Eleventh Circuit's affirmation of
Chandler's death sentence, and former President Clinton's commutation of that sentence).
48. Determining the number of defendants sentenced to death who were actually
innocent in the sense that they had no involvement in the crime with which they were
charged is, of course, difficult. Barring unusual circumstances, a court that reverses the
conviction of a defendant sentenced to death does not even attempt to determine the
defendant's actual guilt or innocence. Most often, a court will simply reverse the defendant's
conviction, granting the government an opportunity to retry the defendant if it does so
within a specified time. In a surprising number of cases, however, DNA or other evidence
has provided seemingly conclusive proof that defendants sentenced to death were innocent
of the capital offense for which they were convicted. See, e.g. , James S. Liebman, The New
Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527,
537 (2002) (observing that in November 1998, a conference held at Northwestern University
"brought national press attention to the fact that as of then, seventy-five men and women
whom American juries had sentenced to die . . . had been exonerated as innocent"). Since
1973, evidence of a defendant's innocence has freed 1 1 1 people from death row. Death
Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did=412&scid=6 (current as of July 28, 2003).
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exonerated through DNA-testing49 or other evidence of a wrongful
conviction50 are only the tip of the iceberg. The Chandler case thus
exemplifies a situation in which a possibly innocent defendant who is
sentenced to death is unable to obtain relief from the courts.
The Chandler case also illustrates the difficulties of appropriately
allocating resources for attorneys representing capital defendants with
strong innocence claims. Chandler's attorney's decision to focus
primarily on obtaining a favorable verdict at the guilt trial is not

49. Since 1973, twelve people have been exonerated and released from death row by
DNA evidence. Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 337 (2002).
50. When a defendant who claims she was wrongfully convicted seeks relief through the
appellate process, she is likely to encounter formidable obstacles. See Lissa Griffin, The
Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. lNT'L L. REV.
1241, 1271 (2001). Appellate courts do not have the authority to hear new evidence, and
most such courts cannot "reverse a conviction because they believe that the jury was wrong."
Id. These courts can review an alleged wrongful conviction, but they must do so on the
grounds that the trial court convicted the appellant on insufficient evidence. Id. When doing
so, a court may examine only record evidence and must view that "evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution." Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted}). It must then determine whether "any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Convicted defendants may also seek a "new trial based on newly discovered evidence."
Id. at 1292. Such trials, however, are "rarely granted" due to "severe time limitations" and
the need to "show a very high probability of success on the merits." Id. In federal courts, for
example, Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a motion for a
new trial "be made within three years of final judgment." Id. at 1292-93. The rule also
requires a court to grant
a new trial . . . only where:
(1) the [new] evidence .. . (has] been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the
new trial . . . (has shown] diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence;
(3) the evidence relied on (is] not . . . merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence
[is] . . . material to the issues involved; and (5) (the evidence] [is] of such [a) nature that in a
new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.
Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks omitted} (quoting Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d
652, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).
If these remedies fail, a defendant who claims she was wrongfully convicted has two
other options: she may file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court or seek executive
clemency. Habeas corpus provides only a slim chance of relief because the Supreme Court,
in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), "drastically limited the right of a convicted
defendant to invoke [it] based on a claim of actual innocence." Griffin, supra, at 1295.
Moreover, even if a defendant would otherwise qualify for habeas relief she still has to
surmount the new barriers imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA}, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-67 (2000}. See generally James S. Liebman, An "Effective
Death Penalty"? A EDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411 , 41518 (2001) (discussing the obstacles posed by AEDPA for wrongfully convicted capital
defendants).
Finally, even when a defendant can show that it is likely she was wrongfully convicted,
obtaining executive clemency is generally difficult. In most jurisdictions, the clemency power
is "entirely discretionary" and subject to the "political process." Griffin, supra, at 1299. As
there is no constituency "favoring the release of convicted criminals,'' id., executive
clemency is unlikely to be granted unless the defendant can make a compelling showing that
she was wrongfully convicted.
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unusual, especially for criminal-defense attorneys with limited
experience in representing capital defendants.51 Like Chandler's
attorney, inexperienced attorneys may believe that preparing for the
penalty trial will be unnecessary because the defendant will not be
convicted of the capital offense at the guilt trial. In addition, because
the attorney is seeking to maximize the defendant's chances at the
guilt trial, she may decide that searching for mitigating evidence to be
introduced at the penalty trial is not an optimal use of her limited
resources.
Even if the attorney believes that there is some chance that the
defendant will be convicted of the capital offense and that introducing
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial could be valuable, she may still
believe that the proper overall strategy is to focus almost entirely on
maximizing the defendant's chances at the guilt trial. When the
attorney adopts this strategy, her options at the penalty trial (if it
occurs) will generally be limited. In most cases, the failure to
investigate mitigating evidence prior to the guilt trial will make it
impossible to introduce significant mitigating evidence at the penalty
trial. Since the penalty trial usually takes place immediately after the
jury finds the defendant guilty of the capital offense, the defense will
almost never have sufficient time between the guilty verdict and the
beginning of the penalty trial to conduct the kind of investigation that
would produce persuasive mitigating evidence.
In other cases, either the defendant's wishes or the lawyer's view of
the significance of the defendant's claim of innocence may shape the
lawyer's strategy. A defendant who has a strong claim of innocence
may be especially likely to tell his attorney that, in the event of a
penalty trial, no mitigating evidence should be presented. The
defendant may believe that, because he has a strong claim of
innocence, all of his attorney's efforts should be directed toward
securing his acquittal; if he is convicted, he doesn't care whether he is
sentenced to death. He may even tell his attorney, "Free me or fry
me." If the lawyer believes the client has a strong claim of innocence,
moreover, she may conclude that seeking mitigating evidence is
unnecessary because, even if the defendant is convicted, the best
strategy at the penalty trial will be to focus exclusively on reasserting
the defendant's claim of innocence. A lawyer familiar with death
penalty scholarship may justify this strategy by pointing to empirical
studies that show that a jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's
guilt is the factor that will most strongly lead them to spare the
defendant's life.52 Based on these studies, the lawyer may assert that in
51. See infra text accompanying note 138.
52 See, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1988)
(presenting interviews from jurors in ten Florida cases that indicated that jurors' lingering
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appropriate cases it is best to argue solely on the ground of lingering
doubt, thus maximizing the likelihood that the jury will spare the
defendant's life on the basis of this factor.
For more than two decades, however, experienced capital-defense
attorneys have recognized that introducing mitigating evidence
explaining the defendant's background and history to the penalty jury
is generally the best way to dissuade the jury from imposing a death
sentence.s3 As the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith,s4 the
1 989 ABA Standards provide that an attorney representing a capital
defendant has an obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available
mitigating evidence" prior to trial.ss In view of these established
professional norms, under what circumstances, if any, can a defense
attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of
innocence reasonably conclude that she need not conduct an
investigation for such evidence? And when the attorney makes this
decision, under what circumstance will her failure to investigate
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?
Although one might think that the answers to these two questions
would be the same, the Court's decisions in Strickland and its progeny
indicate otherwise. In determining whether a capital-defense
attorney's failure to investigate or to introduce mitigating evidence at
a penalty trial is ineffective representation, courts must apply
Strickland v. Washington's two-prong test56 for determining whether
counsel was ineffective. As to the first prong - whether the attorney's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" s7
- Strickland requires courts to afford substantial deference to an
attorney's strategic choices. The Strickland Court determined that
strategic choices made after a full investigation of the facts and law are
"virtually unchallengeable" and that "choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable" if "reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation." ss The Court
added, moreover, that counsel's performance must be judged on the

doubt as to the defendant's guilt was the most important factor to jurors who voted for life
imprisonment). See generally Scott E. Sundby, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1577 n.44 (1998)
(summarizing data relating to lingering doubt).
53. See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 323-24, 335-37 (1983); Welsh S. White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
323, 341 -42, 361.
54. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
55. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 1 1 .4.l(C) (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GUIDELINES].
56. For an explanation of Strickland's two-prong test, see supra note 40.
57. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
58. Id. at 690-91.
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basis of "information supplied by the defendant. "59 Applying these
standards, lower courts have frequently held that strategic choices not
to seek or not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial will
not constitute deficient performance when based on either instructions
from the defendant,<10 or the attorney's view as to the importance of
reasserting the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial.61
Wiggins v. Smith,62 however, took a different view. There, the
Court made clear that in at least some situations, a capital defendant's
attorney's failure to seek mitigating evidence cannot be justified by a
strategic decision to focus on reasserting the defendant's claim of
innocence at the penalty trial. The Court's analysis indicates that in
evaluating a capital defendant's attorney's performance, the practices
of experienced capital-defense attorneys, as reflected in professional
standards such as the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, will at least
sometimes provide the norms against which the attorney's
performance must be measured. In assessing the reasonableness of
strategic choices by attorneys representing defendants with strong
claims of innocence, it is thus appropriate to illuminate these norms
through examining and explaining strategic choices made by defense
attorneys who specialize in capital cases.
In this Article, I will contrast the choices of defense attorneys with
wide experience in capital cases with those made by defense attorneys
who lack such experience, and assess Wiggins's possible impact on the
question of whether the latter group's choices constitute deficient
performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. Broadly
stated, my thesis is that in representing capital defendants with a
strong claim of innocence, certain axioms that govern the practices of
experienced capital-defense attorneys should be viewed as
professional norms, and, in most instances, a capital-defense attorney's
failure to comply with these norms should constitute deficient
performance within the meaning of Strickland.
In developing this thesis, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I
briefly explains Wiggins's holding and identifies and discusses three
situations of particular concern in which Wiggins's application is
59. Id. at 691.
60. See, e.g. , Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002); Coleman v.
Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1012 (2002); Frye v. Lee, 235
F.3d 897 (4th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985); Wiiliams v.
Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd sub nom. Williams v. Woodford, 306
F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2002); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998).

61. See, e.g. , Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 1245 S. Ct. 1513 (2004); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 ( 11th Cir. 2000);
Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710 ( 11th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Kokoraleis v. Director
of III. Dept. of Corr., 963 F. Supp. 1473, 1486-87 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
62. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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unclear. Parts II and III then seek to illuminate the appropriate
standard of care for attorneys representing capital defendants with
strong claims of innocence by considering the practices attorneys with
varying levels of experience report using and eschewing when they
deal with strategic choices relating to the penalty trial in capital cases.
Part II addresses strategic choices that arise when a defense attorney
representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence is
preparing for the penalty trial, focusing especially on decisions that are
influenced by the attorney's view of her resources or the instructions
she has received from the capital defendant. Part Ill addresses
strategic choices that arise when the attorney is deciding what type of
mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial, focusing
first on the circumstances under which the attorney should argue
lingering doubt to the penalty jury, and then on the effect that the
attorney's decision to argue lingering doubt should have on her
strategy with respect to introducing mitigating evidence. By drawing
upon interviews with experienced capital-defense attorneys63 and
penalty-trial transcripts64 that reveal the ways in which they implement
their strategic choices, I approach these issues through the lens of
choices that many expert attorneys found reasonable across the
variety of circumstances that arose in actual cases.
Drawing from various sources, including the material presented in
Parts II and III, Part IV seeks to define the professional norms that
should govern defense attorneys' strategic choices when they are
representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. As I
have indicated, my thesis is that these norms should not only serve as
guides to defense attorneys but also as the standards that must be met
when the attorney's performance is being measured against the first
prong of the Strickland test. I conclude by commenting on some of the
broader implications of the issues discussed in the Article.

63. In preparing this Article I have interviewed twelve criminal-defense attorneys, most
of whom have had extensive experience defending capital defendants (i.e., participating as a
defense attorney in more than twenty capital cases), and two mitigation experts who have
had extensive experience providing social histories (based on investigations for mitigating
evidence) for capital defendants. When I rely on specific information provided by any of
these people, the name of the person interviewed and the date of the interview appear in the
footnote.
64. The penalty-trial transcripts referred to (as well as others not quoted) were sent to
me by attorneys or mitigation experts involved in the cases. These transcripts are on file with
the author.
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WIGGINS V. SMITH'S IMPACT ON COUNSEL'S STRATEGIC
CHOICES

In Wiggins v. Smith65 the Court considered an ineffective assistance
of counsel case in which the reasonableness of a capital defendant's
attorneys' decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence was
at issue. The government sought to justify the attorneys' failure to
conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence on the ground that
the attorneys had made a tactical choice to focus their penalty-trial
strategy entirely on relitigating the defendant's guilt. The Court's
refusal to accept the government's position throws into doubt at least
some capital-defense attorneys' strategic choices to focus solely on
lingering doubt or other innocence claims at the penalty trial. How
many depends, in part, upon the extent to which the Wiggins holding
extends beyond the particular facts of that case. It is thus useful to
explain the Court's holding and to identify issues that the Court's
opinion left unresolved before assessing Wiggins's immediate and
long-term impact.
A.

The Wiggins Decision

Kevin Wiggins was charged with the murder of Florence Lacs, a
seventy-seven-year-old woman who was found drowned in the bathtub
of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland, on September
17, 1988.66 Ms. Lacs was last seen alive on the afternoon of September
15 when a government witness said Wiggins thanked Ms. Lacs for
watching his Sheetrock. 67 Geraldine Armstrong, Wiggins's girlfriend,
testified that Wiggins picked her up at about 7:45 p.m. on September
15. At that time, Wiggins was driving Ms. Lacs's Chevette and was in
possession of her credit card, which Wiggins and Armstrong used
when they went shopping that evening and the next day.68 When
Wiggins was arrested, he told the police that he had found Ms. Lacs's
car with the keys in it in a restaurant parking lot on September 16 and
that Armstrong "didn't have anything to do with this."69 The
government also sought to establish through expert testimony and
other evidence that Ms. Lacs had been murdered on September 15,

65. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
66. Id. at 514.
67. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 632-33 (4th Cir. 2002).
68.
69.

Id. at 634.
Id.
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the same day on which Wiggins had been seen in the vicinity of her
apartment.70
The government's case was thus based primarily on evidence that
Wiggins was seen near the victim's apartment shortly before the time
of her murder and had possession of property taken from her
apartment after the time of the murder.71 No eyewitnesses or forensic
evidence supported the government's claim that Wiggins had been in
Ms. Lacs's apartment on September 15. On the other hand, an
unidentified fingerprint was found in the apartment and the police did
have other possible suspects, especially Armstrong's brother, who
lived just below Ms. Lacs's apartment.72
The defense sought to refute the government's case by showing
that Ms. Lacs was not dead when Wiggins was shown to be in
possession of the property taken from her apartment. To establish this
claim, Dr. Kaufmann, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that,
"within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Mrs. Lacs' time of
death was no earlier than 3 a.m. on Saturday, September 17."73 If Ms.
Lacs had not been killed until September 17, the government's case
against Wiggins was obviously insufficient to establish his guilt.74
The defense elected to have the defendant's guilt determined by a
judge sitting without a jury. The judge rejected Dr. Kaufman's
conclusion as to the time of Ms. Lacs's death. He then concluded that
Wiggins's possession of property taken from a recently murdered
victim combined with the other circumstantial evidence was sufficient
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.75
The defense chose to have Wiggins's penalty trial before a jury. In
order to obtain a death sentence, the government had to prove that

70. The medical examiner testified that the victim had been murdered and that the date
of death could have been September 15. In addition, a friend of the victim's testified that on
September 15 the victim had been wearing the clothes that were found on her murdered
body on September 17, and Wiggins's employer testified that Wiggins had been working
near the defendant's apartment on the afternoon of September 15. Id. at 632-34.
71. In addition, two inmates testified that Wiggins confessed to the murder while
incarcerated; in arriving at a verdict, however, the trial judge indicated that he did not
believe either of these inmates. Id. at 634.
72. See Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 n.9, 557 (D. Md. 2001).
73. Wiggins, 288 F.3d at 634.
74. Even if the government's evidence relating to Ms. Lacs's time of death was accepted,
the government's case against Wiggins was weak. Indeed, the federal district judge who
considered the case on habeas concluded that Wiggins was entitled to relief on the ground
that "no rational finder of fact could have found Wiggins guilty of murder beyond a
reasonable doubt." Wiggins, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
75. In reaching this verdict, the trial judge relied on five factual findings: (1) Wiggins
was in the vicinity of the apartment at the time of the murder; (2) he gave a false statement
to the police about the stolen goods; (3) he knew the victim; (4) the victim was wearing the
same clothes on September 15 as she was when she was found dead on September 17; (5) the
victim's apartment had been ransacked. See id. at 555-56.
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Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree," meaning that he actually
killed Ms. Lacs76 and that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors.77 One month prior to the scheduled beginning of
the penalty trial, defense counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of the
penalty trial so that the defense could first present evidence showing
that Wiggins did not kill Ms. Lacs and then, if necessary, present a
mitigation case. The defense claimed that "separating the two cases
would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting
their claim that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder. "78
Approximately one month later, the j udge denied the defense's
bifurcation motion and the penalty trial began. In her opening
statement, one of Wiggins's two defense attorneys told the jury they
would "hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins
actually killed Lacs. "79 She also told them they were going to hear
evidence relating to Wiggins's life and that he had "had a difficult
life."80 During the penalty trial, however, the defense introduced no
evidence relating to Wiggins's life history.81 Instead, it again
introduced expert testimony attacking the government's theory as to
Ms. Lacs's time of death.82 In essence, the defense sought to convince
the jury that Wiggins could not have "actually killed" the victim
because he was not guilty of her murder.
At the conclusion of the penalty trial, the judge instructed the jury
that Wiggins had been convicted of the first-degree murder of Ms.
Lacs and that they were required to accept that conviction as
"binding" even if they believed it "to have been in error. "83 He then
explained the standard for determining whether Wiggins was a
"principal in the first degree" and instructed them that, if they found
that Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree," they should
determine whether the death penalty should be imposed by weighing

76. Under Maryland's capital-sentencing statute, the jury may not impose the death
penalty unless it first concludes that the defendant was a "principal in the first degree." MD.
CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW§ 2-202(a)(2)(i) (2002). Under Maryland law, "(a] principal in
the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an
inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent." State v. Ward, 396 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Md.
1978).
77. MD. CODE. ANN., CRIMINAL LAW§ 2-203(i)(2)(i) (2002) (stating that a jury must
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating evidence).
78. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16.
83. Joint Appendix of Petitioner and Respondent at 369, Wiggins v. Smith.

August 2004)

A Deadly Dilemma

2015

the aggravating and mitigating factors.84 The jury imposed a death
sentence.s5
Wiggins claimed that his trial attorneys were ineffective because
they failed to conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence
relating to Wiggins's personal history.86 Wiggins's attorneys had
obtained some information relating to his background, including a
presentence investigation report prepared by the Division of Parole
and Probation and DSS records "documenting [Wiggins's] various
placements in the State's foster care system."s7 They had not, however,
retained a forensic social worker to prepare a full compilation of
Wiggins's social history, even though funds for that purpose were
available.ss Wiggins's senior attorney explained that the attorneys had
decided, well in advance of trial, "to focus their efforts on 'retrying the
factual case' and disputing Wiggins' direct responsibility for the
murder."s9 They thus believed that compiling a social history was
unnecessary because they did not want to present a shot-gun defense
that might dilute the force of the evidence disputing Wiggins's
responsibility .90
The Maryland state courts rejected Wiggins's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, concluding that his attorneys had made a "deliberate,
tactical" decision to concentrate their efforts on convincing the
penalty jury that Wiggins was not responsible for the murder.91
Wiggins challenged this ruling in a federal writ of habeas corpus.92 In
view of the applicable federal habeas statute,93 the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the Maryland state courts' ruling denying
Wiggins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an "unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law."94 In order to establish
this, Wiggins first had to show that his attorneys' decision to curtail
investigation so that they did not have Wiggins's complete social

84.

Id.

85. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 523.
88. Id. at 524.
89. Id. at 517.
90. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517.
91. Id. at 518.
92. Id.
93. 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (1996).
94. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (D.
Md. 2001)); id. at 520.
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history was deficient performance under the first prong of the
Strickland test.95
In Strickland, the Court had said that "strategic choices made after
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
investigation. "96 The Wiggins Court thus had to determine whether
Wiggins's attorneys' strategy of curtailing investigation so as to focus
on relitigating the defendant's guilt was reasonable.
In addressing this issue, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
focused on a capital-defense attorney's obligation to investigate for
mitigating evidence. Justice O'Connor stated that Wiggins's attorneys'
decision to curtail the investigation "fell short of the professional
standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989" because "standard
practice in Maryland in capital cases" at that time "included the
preparation of a social history report."97 She indicated, moreover, that
Wiggins's attorneys' decision could not be attributed to lack of
resources because "the Public Defender's office made funds available
for the retention of a forensic social worker" who would prepare the
necessary report.98
The maj ority also observed that " [t]he ABA Guidelines provide
that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence,' "99 adding that
based on both the ABA Guidelines and the A BA Standards for
Criminal Justice, this investigation should delve into various topics,
including the defendant's "family and social history."100 Justice
O'Connor referred to these standards as "well-defined norms,"101 thus
implying that, in the absence of a reasonable justification for a defense
attorney's failure to conduct an investigation into reasonably available
mitigating evidence, the attorney's failure to conduct such an
investigation would constitute deficient performance under Strickland.
Justice O'Connor further concluded that Wiggins's attorneys'
decision to curtail investigation could not be justified as a reasonable

95. In addition, Wiggins had to show that his attorneys' deficient performance
constituted prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test. See supra note 40. In
order to obtain relief under§ 2254(d)(l), moreover, Wiggins had to show that the Maryland
state court's conclusion that the defendant had not established that his attorney's
performance was deficient constituted an "unreasonable application of federal law."
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (D. Md.
2001)).
96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.
97. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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strategic decision; rather, the attorneys' decision to abandon their
investigation when they did " [made] a fully informed decision with
respect to sentencing strategy impossible."102
B.

Three Unresolved Issues

Although Wiggins simply applied Strickland's ineffective assistance
of counsel test, the Court's analysis indicates that its view of the
standard of care required by an attorney representing a capital
defendant may have evolved since Strickland was decided in 1984.103
Although in Strickland the Court implied that professional standards
such as those articulated in the ABA Guidelines would not necessarily
define the standard of care for criminal-defense attorneys,104 the
Wiggins majority indicated that at least the ABA Guidelines relating
to a capital defendant's attorney's obligation to investigate for "all
reasonably available mitigating evidence" does articulate the standard
of care for a defense attorney representing a capital defendant.
Furthermore, the defense attorney may not trump this obligation by
simply asserting that she adopted a strategy that focused exclusively
on reasserting the defendant's possible innocence at the penalty trial.
In assessing Wiggins's application to other situations in which a
capital-defense attorney curtails investigation because she opts for a
strategy of reasserting a claim of innocence at the penalty trial, three
questions seem especially significant. First, in defining counsel's duty
to investigate for mitigating evidence, what does the Court mean by
"all reasonably available mitigating evidence?" Second, can a capital
defense attorney justify a decision to curtail investigation for
mitigating evidence because of the defendant's request that no such
evidence be presented at the penalty trial? And, third, when may the
attorney make a reasonable decision to curtail investigation (or not to
present mitigating evidence) on the basis of a strategic choice that
relates to the quality of the available mitigating evidence?

1.

The D uty to Investigate for "All Reasonably A vailable Mitigating
Evidence"

As explained by the Court, Wiggins provides a clear example of a
case in which the mitigating evidence that counsel failed to investigate
was "reasonably available." At the time of Wiggins's trial, "the Public
Defender's office made funds available for the retention of a forensic
102. Id. at 527-28.
103. For the argument that the standard of care required by a capital defendant's
attorney would evolve as the Court became more familiar with the practices of experienced
capital-defense attorneys, see White, supra note 53.
104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
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social worker"105 who would prepare a report relating to the
defendant's background. Using funds to obtain such a report would
not have affected the extent to which counsel would have resources
available for the guilt trial because the guilt trial had already been
completed. In Wiggins, the mitigating evidence was thus "reasonably
available" not only because counsel could obtain it but also because it
could be obtained without any strain on existing resources.
In other cases, the availability of potential mitigating evidence will
not be so clear. In most jurisdictions, judges have discretion as to the
amount of funds to be allocated to capital-defense attorneys for
investigation.106 In exercising this discretion, judges may limit the
number of expert witnesses or inform the attorney that the total
amount of funds for investigation cannot exceed a certain amount. 107
105. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
106. In most states, statutes provide judges with wide discretion as to the expenses to be
allocated for the investigation and preparation of a capital case. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 987.9 ( West Supp. 2004) (allowing counsel to request funds for payment of
"investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense" and
stating that "a judge . . . shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an
appropriate amount of money to defendant's attorney"); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-14-207(b)
(2003) (authorizing court to grant authorization for "investigative or expert services or other
similar services" necessary to protect defendant's constitutional rights "in a reasonable
amount to be determined by the court"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.052(f)-(g) (Supp.
2004) (allowing counsel to request and court to grant reasonable "advance payment of
expenses to investigate potential defenses"). See generally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal
Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Equal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are
at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 820 (claiming that judges routinely use their

discretion to deny defense counsel the funds needed to adequately investigate a case and
often do so by requiring counsel to show the need for such funds - "a showing that
frequently cannot be made without the very . . . assistance that is sought").
107. See, e.g. , United States v. Hurn, 52 M.J. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist when the court had
already appointed a psychologist), affd on other grounds, 58 M.J. 199 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 416 (2003); Commonwealth v. Shabazz, Nos. CR03000337-00 &
CR02-856, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 74 (Mar. 31, 2003) (finding that the trial court properly
limited mitigation specialist to twenty hours to establish a factual basis for a full investigation
for mitigating evidence); State v. Daniel, No. W2000-00981-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 967, at *33-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (holding that trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist because defendant failed
to make the required showing that (1) defendant would be deprived of a fair trial without
such assistance and (2) there was a reasonable likelihood that such assistance would
materially assist the defense). But see Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1384 (Ind. 1996)
(finding abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to limit a mitigation specialist to
twenty-five hours of investigation, but establishing no clear standards for determining when
a judge's failure to authorize a defense investigation will constitute an abuse of discretion).
The judge's authority to exercise discretion under these statutes is limited, however, by
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1975), which holds that, upon a sufficient showing that his
mental condition will be a significant factor in a capital case, a capital defendant is entitled to
compensation for a psychiatrist to assist the defense. Lower courts have interpreted A ke as
requiring compensation of other defense experts upon an adequate showing that they are
needed to assist the defense in developing a significant issue. See White, supra note 53, at
342. Under A ke, a judge should not be permitted to limit the number of expert witnesses or
to limit the compensation for experts if the defense makes a sufficient showing that an
expert is needed to develop a particular type of mitigation evidence. Jn practice, however,
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In cases where a capital defendant has a strong claim of innocence, his
attorney may believe - rightly or wrongly - that she should opt for
presenting the strongest defense at the guilt stage rather than
diminishing the resources available for that purpose by requesting
funds to investigate for mitigating evidence.108 In this situation, the
attorney may opt either not to investigate for mitigating evidence at all
or to curtail the investigation for mitigating evidence so as not to
diminish the resources available for strengthening the defendant's
defense at the guilt stage.
In applying Wiggins to these situations, courts will have to decide
whether counsel's obligation to investigate for "all reasonably
available mitigating evidence" encompasses an obligation to seek to
obtain all such evidence or only an obligation to seek "mitigating
evidence" that can be obtained without placing a strain on the
resources available for other purposes.

2.

The Defendant Instructs the Attorney Not to Look for Mitigating
Evidence

In Wiggins, there was no indication that the defendant had given
his attorneys any instructions relating to investigating or introducing
mitigating evidence. In cases where a capital defendant has a strong
claim of innocence, however, it is not unusual for the defendant to
instruct the attorney that she is neither to investigate mitigating
evidence nor to present it at the penalty trial in the event the
defendant is convicted at the guilt trial.109 In addition, at some point
during pretrial preparation, the defendant may instruct the attorney
either to stop investigating mitigating evidence entirely or to curtail
some particular aspect of the investigation, such as interviewing
members of the defendant's family. While lower courts have
addressed various situations in which a capital defendant instructed his
attorney to curtail investigation into mitigating evidence,110 Wiggins
did not involve such a situation and the Court did not indicate whether
Wiggins's holding would apply in such cases.

prior to Wiggins, "many defense lawyers [did] not do a good job of mak[ing] a showing of
the need for funds." Email from Stephen Bright to author (Aug. 31, 2003) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Bright email]. For further discussion of Ake, see notes 268-270 infra and
accompanying text.
108. In some cases, the defense attorney's belief that she must choose between
allocating resources to the guilt and penalty stages may be mistaken. If the attorney can
make an sufficient showing under Ake, arguably she should be entitled to compensation for
expert witnesses at the penalty trial regardless of the funds already expended for expert
witnesses at the guilt trial. See supra note 107.
109. See, e.g. , infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text (describing one such case).
1 10. See infra notes 274-282 and accompanying text.
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Strategic Choices to Ignore Potential Mitigating Evidence

At Wiggins's post-conviction hearing, Wiggins's senior attorney
explained the attorneys' decision to curtail investigation, testifying
that prior to trial they decided not to introduce mitigating evidence
relating to the defendant's background because they did not want to
dilute his claim of innocence.111
In Strickland and at least two later cases112 the Court held that,
under the circumstances presented in those cases, a capital defendant's
attorney's decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence was
a reasonable strategic decision and, therefore, did not constitute
deficient performance. In Wiggins, on the other hand, the Court held
that, assuming Wiggins's attorneys' decision to curtail investigation
was a strategic decision, the decision was unreasonable. The question
remains whether, under Wiggins, a decision to curtail investigation and
instead emphasize evidence related to innocence can ever be
reasonable. If so, when?
Characterizing Wiggins's attorneys' decision as strategic is
questionable. As the Court indicated,113 if the attorneys' bifurcation
motion filed prior to the penalty trial had been granted, the attorneys
would not have had to worry about the possibility of diluting the
evidence of Wiggins's innocence that was presented at the penalty
trial. The attorneys would have been able to introduce that evidence
during the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding and, if that strategy
was unsuccessful, introduce mitigating evidence relating to the
defendant's background at the second phase.114 As the Court stated,115
there was thus reason to believe that the attorneys' decision was based
on "inattention" rather than strategy.116 Should the Court desire to
limit its holding in Wiggins, it could distinguish Wiggins from other
situations in which a capital-defense attorney curtails investigation for
mitigating evidence on the ground that in Wiggins the attorneys'
decision to curtail investigation was not really a strategic choice, but
rather a result of inattention or incompetence.

1 1 1. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517.
1 12. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168 ( 1986).
113. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16.
114. Id. at 526.
115. Id. at 534.
1 16. Id. at 526. At the opening of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel "entreated the
jury to consider not just what Wiggins 'is found to have done,' but also 'who [he] is.' " Id.
She then informed the jury that it "would 'hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life.' "
Id. Despite these comments, however, counsel never presented any evidence relating to
"Wiggins' history." Id.
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The majority stated, however, that "assuming [Wiggins's attorneys]
limited the scope of their investigation for strategic reasons,"117 their
decision was unreasonable. To justify this conclusion, Justice
O'Connor explained that the attorneys' decision to abandon their
investigation when they did " [made] a fully informed decision with
respect to sentencing strategy impossible. " 11 8
But why would it be unreasonable for the attorneys to decide that
they would curtail the investigation into Wiggins's background
because they wanted to focus exclusively on relitigating his guilt? The
attorneys' reasoning might be as follows: (1) The evidence of the
defendant's innocence was so strong that it was likely to have a
powerful effect on the sentencing j ury; (2) Presenting mitigating
evidence relating to the defendant's background might dilute the
strength of that evidence, making it less likely that the jury would
spare the defendant because of its lingering doubt as to his guilt; (3)
Therefore, pursuing mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's
background was unnecessary because the attorneys would not choose
to introduce such evidence at the penalty trial.
The majority's analysis indicates that this type of reasoning is
untenable. Justice O'Connor concluded that competent performance
in the Wiggins case required a fuller investigation because in view of
"the strength of the available evidence, a reasonable attorney might
well have chosen to prioritize the mitigation case over the
responsibility challenge," or at least to adopt both "sentencing
strategies" since they were "not necessarily mutually exclusive."1 19 In
other words, regardless of the attorneys' assessment of the strength of
the evidence showing Wiggins's innocence, the attorneys could not
automatically opt for a strategy that focused solely on presenting this
evidence. The Court's analysis thus suggests that, at least in the
absence of an adequate investigation, a capital-defense attorney's
decision to rely solely on relitigating the defendant's guilt at the
penalty trial is unreasonable.
The majority was less clear, however, in delineating the
circumstances under which a capital defendant's attorney can make
the strategic decision to curtail investigation because her preliminary
investigation convinces her that a full investigation for mitigating
evidence would be unproductive. In Wiggins, the preliminary
investigation indicated that the potential mitigating evidence related
to the defendant's troubled childhood and severe mental problems. 120
Wiggins thus indicates that, in the absence of a substantial
1 17. Id. at 527.
1 18. Id. at 527-28.
1 19. Id. at 535
120. Id.
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investigation, an attorney's strategic decision to reject the possibility
of introducing this type of mitigating evidence is unreasonable. The
Court's analysis does not suggest, however, that an attorney could
never reasonably make a strategic choice to curtail investigation
because she concluded that seeking additional mitigating evidence
would be unproductive. On the contrary, the Court intimated that an
attorney would be able to justify such a choice in cases where the
attorney could reasonably conclude that she would not want to
introduce potential mitigating evidence because of a concern that it
would be unproductive or double-edged. 121
Based on Wiggins's holding and analysis, the circumstances under
which a capital defendant's attorney's strategic choice to curtail an
investigation for mitigating evidence will constitute deficient
performance is thus also unclear.
II.
A.

PREPARING FOR THE PENALTY TRIAL

The Division of Responsibility Between Lawyer and Client

In representing a criminal defendant, a defense attorney must
ordinarily be guided by her client with respect to the nature of the
defenses presented. 122 If the defendant tells his attorney to present a
defense at the guilt stage, the attorney will ordinarily be required to
present that defense, even though she is convinced that it is very
weak.123 Similarly, if a competent capital defendant insists that the
attorney present no evidence at the penalty stage in the event he is
convicted of the capital offense, the attorney must adhere to her

121. The Court cited with apparent approval earlier cases in which it had held that a
capital defendant's attorney's decision to curtail investigation was reasonable because the
attorney reasonably concluded that the evidence likely to be disclosed by further
investigation would be double-edged or unproductive. See id. at 2537 (citing Burger v. Kemp,
483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
122. With respect to a lawyer's responsibilities, most states now follow the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1 .2(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued." For statutes codifying this rule, see, for
example, N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. l.2(a) (2003). The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was
replaced by the ABA Model Rules in most states but is still followed in a few states, also
requires that attorneys pursue their clients' desired course of action. See MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1983).
123. However, an attorney cannot assist her client in "conduct that [she] knows is . . .
fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .2(d) (2003). The ABA defines
"fraudulent" as "conduct that . . . has a purpose to deceive." Id. at R. 1 .0. Thus, an attorney
cannot follow a client's directive to present a defense that he or she knows to be false. For
states codifying this rule, see, for example, N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d)
(2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .2(d) (2003).
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client's wishes.124 In practice, however, while the defendant makes the
final decision, the defendant's attorney will often be able to exert
influence that will significantly affect that decision. David Bruck, a
South Carolina defense attorney who has participated in hundreds of
capital cases and is now a Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney
who advises attorneys appointed to represent federal capital
defendants, states that one of a criminal-defense attorney's most
important roles is to "make an assessment of the strength of the
defendant's various possible defenses and to advise the defendant as
to which of those defenses should be presented to the jury and how
they should be presented."125 When the defendant initially asserts an
implausible claim of innocence, for example, an experienced defense
attorney will often be able to dissuade the defendant from asserting
that claim at trial.
When a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence directs
his attorney not to investigate or introduce mitigating evidence at the
possible penalty trial, however, the psychological dynamics involved
are likely to be more complex. In this situation, the defendant's
position probably emanates from his belief that he should not be
convicted of the capital offense. He thus believes that his attorney's
focus should be exclusively on presenting the strongest possible
defense at the guilt trial. If the attorney insists on preparing for the
penalty trial, the defendant may resent the implied suggestion that a
penalty trial may be necessary. His response may be, "I told you I was
innocent. If you are preparing for the penalty trial, that means you
don't believe I am innocent. If you don't trust me when I tell you I am
innocent, I don't trust you to represent me when my life is at stake."126
If the defendant is forced to contemplate the possibility of a conviction
at the guilt stage, moreover, he may be inclined to believe that, if the
jury confounds his expectations at the guilt trial, he doesn't care what
happens at the penalty trial. In fact, it is not uncommon for defendants
with strong claims of innocence to say to their attorneys, "I don't want
124. For example, in Zagorski v. State, the defendant told his attorney before trial that
"if convicted, he preferred death instead of a possible life sentence." Zagorski v. State, 983
S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998). He then instructed counsel neither to investigate nor present
mitigating evidence. Id. The defendant remained firm in his decision, even after his attorney
informed him "about the importance of and the need to investigate" for mitigating evidence.
Id. The attorney then followed the defendant's instructions. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee held that counsel acted reasonably. The court stated that "when a competent
and fully informed defendant instructs counsel not to investigate or present mitigating
evidence at trial, counsel will not later be adjudged ineffective for following those
instructions." Id. at 657.
125. Telephone Interview with David Bruck, Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney
for South Carolina (Apr. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bruck Interview] (notes on file with author).
126. Email from Michael Millman to author (Nov. 10, 2003) (on file with author). For
approaches through which a capital-defense attorney may effectively counter this response,
see infra text accompanying notes 145-149.
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you to present any evidence at the penalty trial. If the jury convicts
me, I'd rather die than be sent to prison."127
B.

The D ifference Bet ween Experienced and Inexperienced Capita/
Defense Attorneys

A capital-defense attorney's approach to the issues presented in
this scenario is likely to vary depending on the extent of her
experience with capital cases. Criminal attorneys lacking experience in
capital cases will be naturally inclined toward focusing their energies
almost exclusively on the guilt trial. Stephen Bright, the Director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, who specializes in capital
cases, explains that these defense attorneys, who are usually skilled
and experienced at raising issues of reasonable doubt in noncapital
cases, are unfamiliar with the capital-defense attorney's role of
arguing for the defendant's life at the penalty stage of a capital trial.128
In fact, these lawyers may perceive that Bright's view of the lawyer's
role at the penalty trial - finding the social and biographical evidence
relating to the defendant's life and then presenting it to the jury in a
way that will "humanize" the defendant so that the jury has a fuller
understanding of who the defendant is, where he has come from, and
why he is the way he is129 - is "a job that should be done by a social
worker rather than a lawyer."130 When a lawyer with this perspective
has a client who requests that she focus primarily or exclusively on the
guilt trial, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will be inclined
to minimize the extent to which they prepare for the penalty trial,
using the client's instructions to justify a focus they might make in any
event.131
In addition, criminal-defense lawyers lacking experience in capital
cases may dismiss the importance of preparing for the penalty trial
127. Telephone Interview with Richard Jaffe (Mar. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Jaffe Interview]
(notes on file with author).
128. Telephone Interview with Stephen Bright (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bright
Interview] (notes on file with author).
129. Attorneys with experience in capital cases have long recognized the importance of
introducing mitigating evidence that will humanize the capital defendant, thereby leading
the penalty jury to empathize with the defendant. See, e.g. , Goodpaster, supra note 53, at
321-24, 335-37; White, supra note 53, at 361. For an account of a recent capital case in which
a capital defendant's attorney was able to obtain a life sentence for his client by presenting
evidence at the penalty trial that traced the defendant's troubled history, thereby obtaining
the penalty jury's empathy, see Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, (Magazine), at 32.
130. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
131. Bright email, supra note 107. Bright points out that, even if the client does not give
the lawyer any instructions, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will tend to focus
disproportionately on the guilt trial and not enough on the penalty trial because they are
"more comfortable with the guilt phase." Id.
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because they share their client's view that he will be acquitted of the
capital offense. Michael Burt, a former federal death-penalty resource
counselor who frequently advises attorneys representing capital
defendants,132 says that lawyers with experience in ordinary criminal
cases, but not in capital cases, often "grossly underestimate the
difficulty in convincing a death-qualified jury that there is a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt."133 Burt states that "death-qualified
juries do not evaluate evidence in the same way as other juries and are
thus much more likely than other juries to credit the prosecution's
evidence and less likely to acquit the defendant or to find him guilty of
a lesser [i.e., noncapital] offense."134 Others with wide experience in
capital cases not only share Burt's view but state that death-qualified
juries' conviction proneness (i.e., its tendency to convict more readily
than a non-death-qualified jury) has increased in recent years.135
Experienced practitioners have a sense that in recent years increasing
doubts about the death penalty have led to the exclusion of more fair
minded people from death-qualified juries.136 As a result, capital
defendants are "losing more good jurors than ever."137

132. From 1989 to 2002, Burt was head trial attorney in the San Francisco Public
Defender's Office. Telephone Interview with Michael Burt (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Burt
Interview] (notes on file with author).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Michael Charlton, a Texas attorney who has participated in dozens of capital cases,
for example, stated that with respect to determining issues related to guilt or innocence, "the
difference between ordinary juries and death-qualified juries is far greater than most people
realize." Telephone Interview with Michael Charlton (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Charlton
Interview] (notes on file with author). A death-qualified jury is one in which the prosecutor
is allowed to exclude potential jurors on the ground that their opposition to capital
punishment impairs their ability to render a proper verdict on a capital defendant's guilt or
punishment. For an explanation of the current law relating to death-qualification, see note
136 infra. For data relating to the differences between death-qualified and non-death
qualified juries, see generally Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror A ttitudes About the Death
Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 715, 725 (1998) (providing analysis of studies relating to death-qualifying the jury
indicating that the death qualification process produces juries that in comparison to the
normal population have "a 44% increased probability . . . to vote for conviction").
136. In most jurisdictions, the rule allowing the government to have a death-qualified
jury took root during the nineteenth century. In order to obtain jurors who would not refuse
to convict or to sentence a capital defendant to death because of their opposition to capital
punishment, the prosecutor was permitted to exclude veniremen whose scruples about
capital punishment might render them incapable of voting for a conviction or a death
sentence in a capital case. See Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End:
Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1986). In Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court limited the prosecutor's right to exclude such
veniremen to cases in which the veniremen made it unmistakably clear that their views
against capital punishment would lead them to vote automatically against the death penalty
or to decline to impose a verdict that could result in a death sentence. In Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412 (1985), however, the Court sharply limited Witherspoon, holding that a
prosecutor may exclude a venireman when there is sufficient evidence that her views on
capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as
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Defense attorneys who are unaware of this difference may
mistakenly believe that their ability to convince the jury of a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt will obviate the necessity
for a penalty trial. Indeed, Burt states that it is not unusual for
attorneys who lack experience in such cases to "talk themselves into
thinking they don't have to worry about the penalty phase because
they have a great shot of winning the case."138 Burt adds that some
lawyers soliciting his advice have asked him to "validate their
decision" not to seek mitigating evidence in preparation for the
penalty phase of a capital trial because their clients, who are
presenting claims of innocence at the guilt trial, do not want them to
present such evidence. 139 Indeed, even some attorneys who have had
experience in capital cases can remember capital cases in which they
did no preparation for the penalty trial because they believed that
their client's strong claim of innocence would prevail at the guilt
trial.140
Burt and other attorneys who specialize in capital cases
unequivocally reject this approach.141 Because they are aware that
even a defendant with a strong claim of innocence may be found guilty
of a capital offense, these attorneys state that a lawyer representing a
capital defendant should always prepare for the penalty trial. At a
minimum, the lawyer should prepare a social history of the client.142
This history, which can generally be best assembled by an expert who
has a background in psychology or social work, will trace the
defendant's life from birth (or in some cases even before he was born)

a juror" with respect to applying the law relating to the circumstances under which the
defendant should be convicted of a capital crime or sentenced to death. Id. at 424 (quoting
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). For a detailed analysis of Witherspoon and Witt, see
Krauss supra.
137. Interview with Russell Stetler (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Stetler Interview] (notes
on file with author). Stetler is the director of Investigation and Mitigation for the New York
State Defender Organization. He supervises investigators and mitigators in all capital cases
handled by his office.
138. Burt Interview, supra note 132. For a fuller explanation of Burt's view on this
point, see Michael N. Burt, Overview: Effective Capital Representation in the Twenty-First
Century, in 1 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 7 (1998 ed.).
139. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
140. Michael Charlton remembered at least one case in which he and the other defense
attorneys representing a Texas capital defendant decided to do no preparation for the
penalty stage of the case because they were confident that the defendant would be acquitted.
Even though that defendant was in fact acquitted, Charlton said that his present policy is to
prepare for the penalty trial whenever he represents a capital defendant. In addition, he
stated that he would make every attempt to pursue this policy even if his client stated that he
did not want to have mitigating evidence presented at the penalty trial. Charlton Interview,
supra note 135.
141 . Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
142. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
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to the present.143 The history should be based on a wealth of data:
information provided by the defendant's family members and people
who have known him during the various stages of his life, the
defendant's school and other institutional records, reports from
mental-health professionals or other experts who have examined the
defendant, and other relevant data.144 One of the purposes of the
social history is to provide defense counsel with potential mitigating
evidence to be presented at the penalty trial.
A capital defendant who objects to the idea of introducing
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is, of course, likely also to
object to the idea of preparing a social history that includes potential
mitigating evidence. Experienced capital-defense attorneys say that
there are at least two ways to deal with such objections:145 If the
defendant would agree that a death sentence is a worse alternative
than a life sentence, the attorney can emphasize to the client that it is
"always necessary to prepare for the worst."146 The attorney might tell
her client that, even though she is hopeful that the defendant's trial
defense will be successful, she wants to be prepared for every
contingency. Therefore, it is essential that the attorney be prepared to
present persuasive mitigating evidence at the penalty trial in the event
the defendant is found guilty of the capital offense.
In addition, the defense attorney can truthfully tell her client that
investigating the defendant's background may lead to evidence that
will assist the defense at the guilt stage.147 Witnesses who are familiar
with the defendant may be able to testify to his good character,
thereby convincing the jury that the defendant is simply not the kind
of person who could have committed the crime.148 Or, if the
government is introducing the defendant's incriminating statements to
establish his guilt, evidence relating to the defendant's mental
problems may be used to cast doubt on his statements' reliability.149

143. For examples of social histories compiled by mitigation experts, see White, supra
note 53, at 325-29. In order to compile an adequate social history, the mitigation expert will
often need the assistance of other court-appointed experts. See id. at 342-44.
144. See id. at 341-42.
145. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
146. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
147. Id.; Telephone Interview with Gary Taylor, Austin, Tex., Attorney for capital
defendants, (Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Taylor Interview] (notes on file with author).
148. A defendant in a criminal case is allowed to have witnesses testify to his good
character for the purpose of showing that, in view of his character traits, he was less likely to
have committed the crime charged. Character witnesses often testify to the defendant's
peaceful reputation, for example, for the purpose of showing the defendant was less likely to
have attacked the victim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watkins, 843 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 2003).
149. Interview with John Niland, Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney for Texas
(Mar. 1 1 , 2003) [hereinafter Niland Interview] (notes on file with author). For an analysis of
cases in which capital defendants with mental problems were convicted on the basis of
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When dealing with a capital defendant who persists in objecting to
the introduction of mitigating evidence at the penalty trial,
experienced capital-defense attorneys will sometimes exert
considerable pressure on the defendant to change his mind. Richard
Jaffe, an Alabama defense attorney who has represented dozens of
capital defendants, provides an example. Jaffe was appointed to
represent Gary Drinkard at his retrial for a capital offense. At his first
trial, Drinkard, who consistently maintained his innocence, had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the penalty trial
in that case, Drinkard's attorney presented no mitigating evidence
because Drinkard had instructed him not to.150 After Drinkard's
conviction and death sentence were reversed,151 Jaffe and two other
attorneys represented Drinkard at his second trial. 152
While these attorneys were preparing for Drinkard's second trial,
Drinkard indicated that, if he was again convicted of the capital
offense, he still did not want to have any mitigating evidence
presented at the penalty trial. 153 He stated that he would rather be
executed than spend the rest of his life in prison.154 When Jaffe was
informed of this, he met with Drinkard for the first time. He told
Drinkard that they had a great defense team and that he thought the
investigation and preparation for trial was going very well. He then
told Drinkard that he could not continue to be a part of the defense
team if Drinkard persisted in his refusal to have mitigating evidence
introduced at a possible penalty trial. When Drinkard asked why, Jaffe
replied, "I don't defend people who want to die."155 Drinkard then
changed his mind and signed an agreement that stated that he was
willing to have his attorneys present mitigating evidence on his behalf
in the event that there was a penalty trial. The agreement was
ultimately irrelevant, however, because Drinkard was acquitted at his
second trial. 156
The pressure exerted by Jaffe on Drinkard may seem aggressive.
Stephen Bright observes, however, that capital-defense attorneys will
often have to be very forceful in dealing with defendants who do not
want to have evidence presented at the penalty trial. Logic and other

police-induced false confessions, see Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 601.
150. See Ex parte Gary Drinkard, 777 So. 2d 295, 296 (Ala. 2000).
151. See id. (reversing a conviction because evidence of prior bad acts was improperly
admitted at trial).
152. Jaffe Interview, supra note 127.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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persuasive techniques that might be successful in other contexts are
less likely to be successful with such defendants because they may be
incapable of either focusing on the penalty trial or understanding the
impact that the failure to prepare for that trial may have on the jury's
ultimate decision. In Bright's judgment, however, the "failure to
prepare for the penalty trial" is not a viable option because
introducing mitigating evidence that "will provide the jury with an in
depth understanding of the defendant" and the people connected to
him is generally the only way that defense counsel can avoid a death
sentence.157 When there is a disagreement between the attorney and
the client, it is thus imperative that the attorney use every permissible
means to convince the defendant that the defense should present
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial.
C.

The Attorney's Obligation to Investigate in Preparation for the
Penalty Trial

From the capital-defense attorney's perspective, convincing the
defendant that the defense needs to investigate for the purpose of
presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is important
because it will facilitate the investigation.158 Even if the defendant does
not agree that the defense should introduce mitigating evidence at a
possible penalty trial, however, the attorney should nevertheless insist
that an investigator compile a complete social history of the
defendant. From the attorney's perspective, the social history is
indispensable for two reasons: first, as Michael Burt explained,1 59 it
may uncover evidence relevant to the guilt trial; second, the attorney
needs the fruits of the investigation to provide the defendant with
information that will enable him to make an informed choice with
respect to his options at the penalty trial.
As previously indicated,160 a capital defendant with a strong claim
of innocence may be unable to focus on the penalty trial prior to the
guilt trial. In order to ensure that the defendant makes an informed
decision as to the strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial, the
defense attorney will thus sometimes have to postpone the final
discussion of this issue until the defendant has been convicted of the
capital offense. In order to make the defendant fully aware of his
options at that time, however, the attorney must be aware of the

157. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
158. In addition to providing information relating to his own background, the defendant
may be able to identify witnesses or significant aspects of his life that will be valuable to the
investigator compiling the defendant's social history.
159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
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nature of any potential mitigating evidence so that she will be able to
explain to the defendant the value of introducing that evidence at the
penalty trial.161
When a capital defendant has no objection to presenting mitigating
evidence at the penalty trial, the defense attorney's obligation to
investigate will generally be clear. As the Court observed in Wiggins,
the A BA Guidelines have long provided that a capital-defense
counsel's investigation should "comprise efforts to discover all
reasonably available mitigating evidence."162 Neither the ABA
Guidelines nor any other source suggests that a capital-defense
attorney's obligation to investigate mitigating evidence varies
depending on the strength of the capital defendant's defense at the
guilt trial.
Is there any basis for concluding that an attorney's obligation to
investigate should vary depending on this factor? Since every lawyer
knows that defenses that appear rock solid before trial sometimes may
be eviscerated in court, a capital-defense attorney surely cannot rely
on the fact that the capital defendant's claim of innocence will be so
strong as to negate the possibility of a penalty trial.
Some defense attorneys may believe, however, that in certain types
of cases there is no need to investigate mitigating evidence because,
even if the defendant is convicted of the capital offense, the proper
strategy at the penalty trial will be to rely entirely on persuading the
j ury that they should not sentence the defendant to death because of
their lingering doubt as to his guilt. When the government's case is
based on weak circumstantial evidence, for example, the defense
attorney may assert: first, if the defendant is convicted, a lingering
doubt argument should be made to the penalty jury; and, second, since

161. The latest ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases clarify the nature of the capital-defense attorney's obligation. They first
explain the nature of the problems presented. Some defendants "initially insist they want to
be executed - as punishment for their crimes or because they believe they would rather die
than spend the rest of their lives in prison." ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 10.5 cmt. (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 GUIDELINES] . Others "want to contest their guilt but not present
mitigation." Id. Counsel, however, cannot "simply acquiesce" to these desires because they
usually reflect "overwhelming feelings of guilt or despair rather than a rational decision." Id.
Thus, according to the new ABA Guidelines, "(t]he investigation regarding guilt should be
conducted regardless of any admission or statement by the client that evidence bearing upon
guilt is not to be collected or presented." Id. Guideline 10.7(A)(l) (emphasis added). The
same holds true for the penalty phase. Id. Guideline 10.7(A)(2). Counsel may not simply
advise her client of the possible trial or penalty alternatives and then follow the client's
directives as to which ones he or she wants to pursue. An investigation must be conducted.
Id. Guideline 10.7 cmt. Without a "thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the
case," counsel cannot reasonably advise her client "about the merits of different courses of
action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client's
competency to make such decisions." Id. Guideline 10.7 cmt.
162. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
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a jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt is the factor that is
most likely to lead the jury to spare the defendant's life,163 the attorney
should not dilute the force of the lingering-doubt argument by
introducing mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's
background. In order to assess this claim's validity, it is necessary to
consider under what circumstances the strategy of relying solely on a
claim of lingering doubt at the penalty trial is reasonable.
III.
A.

DEFENSE COUNSEL'S STRATEGY AT THE PENALTY TRIAL

The Effect of the Defendant's Claim of Innocence at the Guilt Trial

When a capital defendant who presented a claim of innocence at
the guilt trial is convicted of the capital offense, the defendant's
attorney will often need to consider whether she should continue to
assert the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial. Even
though the jury rejected this claim at the guilt stage, the attorney may
believe that she should continue to assert this claim, arguing that
jurors should vote to spare the defendant's life if they have any
residual or lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt. If the attorney
does decide to argue that the jury should spare the defendant's life
because of lingering doubts as to his guilt, she may have to make other
difficult decisions, including how she should present the lingering
doubt claim and what other evidence and arguments will be
compatible with that claim.
When the defense attorney believes that the claim of innocence
presented at the guilt trial was strong, she may firmly believe that she
should continue to press this claim at the penalty trial. When the jury
in a capital case does have a lingering doubt as to the defendant's
guilt, it seems clear that it will view such a doubt as one of the
strongest possible reasons for sparing the defendant's life.164 If the
defense attorney has asserted a claim of innocence that seemed strong
to her, she may naturally believe that at least one of the j urors will be
sufficiently persuaded by that evidence to have a lingering doubt as to
the defendant's guilt, and, in some jurisdictions, even one such juror
may be enough to avoid a possible death sentence.165 In capital cases
163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
165. Under most sentencing statutes, the jury must unanimously agree to impose the
death sentence. See, e.g. , 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (c)(iv)-(v) (West Supp. 2004)
(stating a capital jury must unanimously decide to impose a death sentence, otherwise the
judge will end the jury's deliberations and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment); 1 8
U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) (stating the jury must unanimously find aggravating factors and if
they cannot do so, the court "shall impose a sentence other than death"); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 701 .1 1 (2002) (requiring a "unanimous recommendation of death" and if the jury
cannot agree to a sentence, the sentence must be "imprisonment for life without parole or
imprisonment for life").
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where a strong claim of innocence was presented at the guilt trial,
some defense attorneys will thus believe that the best penalty-trial
strategy is to argue that the jury should not impose the death penalty
because of their lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt. In some of
these cases, moreover, these attorneys apparently believe that the
argument relating to lingering doubt is the only argument that needs
to be presented at the penalty trial.166 Instead of also presenting other
mitigating evidence that might give the jury additional reasons for
sparing the defendant's life, they rely solely on the argument that the
jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt should lead it to
impose a life sentence.167
The experienced capital-defense attorneys with whom I spoke,
however, uniformly reject a strategy that places undue emphasis on
convincing the jury that has just convicted a defendant that there is a
lingering doubt as to that defendant's guilt. As I have already
indicated, 168 jurors on a death-qualified jury are likely to evaluate
evidence in a way that is strongly favorable to the prosecution. These
jurors are thus significantly less likely than the normal population to
perceive a lingering doubt, or any kind of doubt, as to a criminal
defendant's guilt. In addition, members of any jury may believe that
once the jury has returned a guilty verdict, that verdict resolves all
possible doubts against the defendant.169 Indeed, they may feel that a
defense attorney's argument that there is still a lingering doubt as to
guilt is disrespectful to the jury in the sense that it challenges the
legitimacy of their recently returned verdict.170
Additionally, empirical data indicate that one of the factors that is
most likely to lead j urors to spare a capital defendant's life is their

166. In several cases, lower courts have held that a capital defendant's attorney made a
reasonable choice to rely primarily or exclusively on the strategy of arguing "residual" or
"lingering" doubt at the defendant's penalty trial. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 218
F.3d 1305, 1320 ( 11th Cir. 2000); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 715-16 ( 11th Cir. 1999).
167. See, e.g. , Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corrs., 331 F.3d 764, 787-88 (11th Cir.
2003) (trial counsel argued residual doubt following defendant's conviction and did not
present much mitigating evidence out of concern that it would do more harm than good),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1513 (2004); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 ( 11th Cir. 2000)
(en bane) (trial counsel presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial and primarily
a residual doubt claim at the penalty trial); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 716 (11th Cir.
1999) (same).
168. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
169. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 1576-80 (describing how after returning a guilty
verdict, penalty jurors frequently fail to perceive a difference between reasonable and
residual doubt; rather, they view their verdict as foreclosing any doubt as to the defendant's
guilt).
,
170. Id. at 1578 (telling how some jurors feel insulted at the suggestion that they should
have lingering doubts; these jurors fervently believe that they "would not have convicted the
defendant in the first place had any such doubt existed").
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perception that the defendant is remorseful.171 When the defense has
asserted that the defendant is innocent during the guilt trial, the
defendant cannot credibly express remorse for committing the crime
at the penalty trial. If the defense argues lingering doubt at the penalty
trial, however, the jury may view this argument as the strongest
possible indication of the defendant's lack of remorse. If the defense
insists that there is still a doubt as to whether the defendant
committed the crime, then clearly the defendant not only lacks
remorse for his crime, but is not even willing to take the first step
toward accepting responsibility for committing it.172
Experienced capital-defense attorneys thus conclude that even in
cases where a strong claim of innocence has been presented at the
guilt trial, the defense should sometimes make no reference to the
possibility of lingering doubt at the penalty trial.173 Instead, the
defense should take the position that the guilt and penalty trials are
completely separate proceedings. If one attorney represented the
defendant at the guilt trial, it may be helpful to have a new attorney
represent him at the penalty trial. That attorney may begin by telling
the jury that the defense accepts the jury's verdict. She will then
explain that the case has now entered a new stage in which the jury
will have to decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death
or life in prison and that, in deciding this question, they will need to
"look at who the defendant is. "174 The attorney will then proceed to
present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's
background, including his childhood, his mental health, the difficulties
he has encountered, his accomplishments, and other circumstances,
including perhaps "the suffering [the defendant's family] will go
through if [the defendant] is sentenced to death."175 Although the
attorney may hope that some jurors will refuse to vote for the death
penalty because they have a lingering doubt as to the defendant's
guilt, 176 she may decide not to refer to this possibility during the

171. John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR?
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (making the same
observations as Sundby, supra note 52, at 1578); Sundby, supra note 52, at 1566 (detailing

AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144, 164-65

interviews in which jurors "frequently articulated . . . that they likely would have voted for a
life sentence instead of death had the defendant expressed remorse").
172. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 1574 (concluding, based on interviews with jurors,
that "a defendant's degree of remorse is largely a reflection of whether the defendant is at
least acknowledging the killing or whether he is refusing to accept any responsibility for the
killing").
173. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
174. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
175. Bright email, supra note 107.
176. According to experienced capital-defense attorneys, juries in capital cases
sometimes decide during the guilt trial that they will not impose the death sentence. Jurors
who have some doubt as to the defendant's guilt may agree to vote for a guilty verdict only
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penalty trial but instead to focus entirely on presenting mitigating
evidence that will provide the jury with a multilayered picture of the
defendant.
As in every capital case, defense attorneys who have presented a
claim of innocence at the guilt trial will have to make choices as to the
nature of the mitigating evidence to be presented at the penalty trial.
In a typical case, the investigation of the defendant's social history will
yield a wide array of evidence. Some of this evidence could be
presented at the penalty trial for the purpose of explaining why the
defendant committed the crime: perhaps his mental problems reduced
his ability to control his conduct, or the abuse he was subjected to as a
child made him more prone to respond aggressively to stressful
situations.177
In cases where the defense has presented a strong claim of
innocence at the guilt stage, experienced capital-defense attorneys
state that they will be less likely to introduce mitigating evidence
designed to explain why the defendant committed the crime. Their
reasoning is that it is essential for the defense to maintain a consistent
theory throughout the capital trial.178 If the defense has maintained
throughout the guilt trial that the defendant did not commit the
offense, introducing evidence at the penalty trial that seems to explain
why he committed it may lead the jury to view the defense attorney as
disingenuous. If the defense's penalty-trial evidence provides an
explanation for why the defendant is likely to respond to a stressful
situation with violence, for example, the j ury may feel that defense
counsel should have presented this evidence at the guilt stage rather
than asserting a claim of innocence without providing information that
would have helped the jury assess that claim.
When it is possible, the defense will thus try to present only
mitigating evidence at the penalty trial that is consistent with the
defendant's claim of innocence at the guilt trial. Such evidence, which
attorneys refer to as "good-guy" evidence, may include evidence
relating to the defendant's good character, his good employment
record, or as in the Chandler case, the help he has provided to others
in various situations.179 Even if strong evidence of this type is not
available, the defense might at least be able to present testimony that

on the condition that the jury will not impose the death sentence. Bright Interview, supra
note 128; Bruck Interview, supra note 125.
177. See White, supra note 53, at 360-65.
178. See Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty: What Makes Death Different?,
42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 708 (1991).
179. In some cases, capital-defense attorneys will be able to introduce evidence relating
to the defendant's positive contributions in prison. In one case, the defendant's mitigating
evidence related to the fact that he had defused a dangerous situation in prison, thereby
probably saving another prisoner's life. Jaffe Interview, supra note 127.
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the defendant is a nonaggressive individual who does not have a prior
history of violent behavior.
If significant good-guy evidence is introduced, it will dovetail with
the claim of innocence asserted at the guilt trial. Through presenting
this evidence, the defense attorney hopes to revive any doubts that
members of the jury may have had as to the defendant's guilt. In the
course of explaining who the defendant is, the defense attorney hopes
to reinforce the idea that the defendant is not the kind of person who
would have committed this crime. Some experienced capital-defense
attorneys can recall cases in which, after they had presented strong
good-guy mitigating evidence, the penalty jury not only declined to
impose the death penalty but asked if they could change the guilty
verdict they rendered at the guilt stage,180 a possibility that is
foreclosed by the rule that the jury cannot change its verdict after it
has been accepted by the court.181
Unfortunately, in some cases in which the defendant has
maintained his innocence during the guilt trial, good-guy evidence that
could buttress this claim at the penalty trial will be noticeably lacking.
The only potential mitigating evidence will be witnesses who may be
able to provide a sympathetic portrait of the defendant but can do so
only by testifying to his problems, which may include, for example,
"severe mental impairment perhaps resulting from organic brain
damage and a profoundly troubled childhood in which the defendant
was subjected to horrendous abuse and profound neglect."182 Evidence
of this type is double-edged in the sense that, while it does explain
where the defendant has come from and how he got to be the way he
is, it also has the potential to not only eliminate any lingering doubts
jurors might have had as to the defendant's guilt, but also to
strengthen their perception that sparing his life will enhance the
danger to society, a consideration that empirical data indicate will
weigh heavily in the penalty jury's decision.183

180. Charlton Interview, supra note 135; Niland Interview, supra note 149.
181. In determining the scope of a jury's authority to change its verdict in a capital case,
courts have invariably concluded that "the authority of a jury to amend or correct a criminal
verdict terminates with the beginning of the next phase of the proceeding." See David J.
Marchitelli, Annotation, Criminal Law: Propriety of Reassembling Jury to A mend, Correct,
Clarify, or Otherwise Change Verdict After Jury Has Been Discharged, or Has Reached or
Sealed Its Verdict and Separated, 14 A.LR. 5th 89, 172 (1993).

182. Charlton Interview, supra note 135. According to Stephen Bright, it is not at all
unusual for a capital defendant to have this kind of background. Bright Interview, supra note
128.
183. Results from the Capital Jury Project show that jurors "who believed the defendant
would be a future danger [were] more likely to vote for death . . . than [those] who believed
otherwise." Blume et al., supra note 171, at 165. Such jurors fear that "unless the defendant
is executed he will be released from the secure confines of prison too soon." Id. at 176.
Death, they believe, is "the only real way to guarantee the defendant's incapacitation." Id.
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The choice of whether to present double-edged mitigating
evidence or to present little or no mitigating evidence might seem to
present a dilemma for a capital-defense attorney. When confronted
with this choice, however, experienced capital-defense attorneys
invariably conclude that mitigating evidence must be presented, even
if there is some chance that the jury may view it as double-edged.
Stephen Bright states that in a capital case, defense counsel should
always present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's
background and history to the j ury, thereby enabling the jury to gain
an understanding of the defendant as a person.184 As another
experienced attorney explains, "You have to put the jury in the
defendant's neighborhood" so that the jurors will be able to
"understand where he's been" and "what it was like growing up in the
way he did. "185
If no mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's background is
presented, the jurors are likely to feel they "have no reason to spare
the defendant's life."186 On the other hand, even double-edged
mitigating evidence can be used to present a powerful case for life by
causing the jury to empathize with the defendant. According to John
Niland, an experienced Texas capital-defense attorney, if the evidence
is effectively presented, the jurors may end up at least feeling that they
have some understanding of the difficulties the defendant has
experienced, in which case they will be less inclined to impose the
death penalty.187 In nearly all capital cases, experienced capital
defense attorneys thus opt to introduce double-edged mitigating
evidence when introducing such evidence is the only means of
explaining the defendant's life.188

184. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
185. Charlton Interview, supra note 135.
186. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
187. Niland Interview, supra note 149.
188. Defense counsel may also be able to take measures to neutralize the adverse effects
of potentially double-edged mitigating evidence. When dealing with mitigating evidence that
is double-edged because it suggests that the defendant is the kind of person who would be
likely to have committed the crime - the defendant's violent or troubled background, for
example - defense counsel can sometimes argue that this evidence provides an explanation
for why the police might mistakenly suspect the defendant of the crime. Niland Interview,
supra note 149. If the mitigating evidence is double-edged because it suggests that the
defendant may pose a future danger to society, moreover, defense counsel may be able to
neutralize this evidence by introducing evidence that shows the defendant will not pose any
danger to society if he is incarcerated for life. Evidence relating to the defendant's prior
good conduct in prisons or other institutions, for example, may show that the defendant is
dangerous only when he is in an unstructured environment. If he is sentenced to life in
prison, he will not be a threat to anyone. In some cases, however, the extent to which
defense counsel can neutralize the effect of double-edged mitigating evidence may be
limited.

A Deadly Dilemma

August 2004)

B.

2037

A rguing Lingering Doubt at the Penalty Trial

Even though arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury is often
risky, experienced capital-defense attorneys believe there are
situations in which such arguments should be made. In deciding
whether to argue lingering doubt, these attorneys will consider various
factors, including the length of the jury's deliberations, the strength
and nature of both the government's and the defendant's case, the
nature of the defense's possible penalty-trial evidence, and the law of
the jurisdiction relating to whether evidence or argument relating to
lingering doubt may be introduced. In most cases, these same factors
will also play an important part in determining the content of the
attorney's lingering-doubt argument, the extent to which the attorney
will introduce other mitigating evidence, and the ways in which the
attorney will interweave the arguments relating to lingering doubt
with those relating to the other evidence. In order to illustrate
experienced capital-defense attorney's strategies, I will provide
examples of several lingering-doubt arguments, and then a fuller
description of two penalty arguments, which illustrate the context in
which lingering-doubt arguments are presented and the methods
through which skilled capital-defense attorneys interweave these
arguments with those based on different types of mitigating evidence.

1.

Examples of Lingering-Doubt Arguments

In some cases, an experienced capital-defense attorney will decide
to argue lingering doubt only if the jury's lengthy deliberations at the
guilt stage signal that at least some of the jurors have doubts as to the
defendant's guilt.189 When the jury's deliberations indicate the
possibility of such doubts, the defense attorney will advert to the jury's
deliberations in her closing argument, explaining to the jurors that, if
any of them had doubts as to the defendant's guilt for the capital
offense, this provides a reason why they should vote against the death
penalty.
This kind of argument can be effective even if the issue that
precipitated lengthy j ury deliberation related to the defendant's
degree of guilt rather than his total innocence. For example, in a case
involving William Brooks, a young African American charged with
robbing, raping, and intentionally shooting to death a young white
woman, Brooks's attorney, Stephen Bright, did not dispute that
Brooks had robbed, raped, and shot the young woman, causing her
death. The defense did maintain, however, that the shooting was
accidental rather than intentional. At the guilt trial, the jury

189. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
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adjudicated Brooks guilty of capital murder, but only after engaging in
lengthy deliberations relating to the question of whether the shooting
was intentional or accidental.190
In his penalty-trial argument, Bright referred to the jury's lengthy
deliberations as a reason why the death penalty should not be
imposed:
And we told you about the circumstances of the gun going off and you

spent a day agonizing over that and I'm sure discussing it back and forth
and you came to the decision you came to. But I'd suggest to you, ladies

and gentlemen, that part of that struggle is a reason for voting for a life
sentence in this case, the fact that it was a close question, a difficult
question, a question that obviously some of you had different views
about before you came to an ultimate agreement on it. But if there's
some lingering question among any of you as to exactly what happened
when all those events were going on out there, that's a reason to consider

life and vote for life because that goes to the degree of culpability and
blameworthiness in this case.191

Bright's argument was obviously directed to the members of the j ury
who had earlier had difficulty in concluding that the defendant had
intentionally shot the victim. While not criticizing those jurors'
decision to j oin with the majority in returning a verdict of guilty of
capital murder, Bright's argument emphasized that each juror should
reconsider whether she had any lingering doubt as to the defendant's
guilt and, if she had such a doubt, to use it as a basis for declining to
vote for the death sentence.
When the government's case has obvious weaknesses - a key
government witness has been shown to be unreliable, for example the defense attorney may decide to make a lingering-doubt argument
in a way that exploits this weakness. In making this argument, the
attorney will generally be careful to avoid any express or implied
criticism of the jury's verdict. David Bruck observes that, in such
cases, he will sometimes begin his argument relating to lingering doubt
by telling the j ury that, based on the evidence they had to work with
and the standard of proof they were required to apply, their verdict
was at least reasonable.192 After thus making it clear that he respects
the jury's verdict, Bruck will then explain that the jury should adopt a
different perspective in deciding whether the evidence is strong
enough to warrant a death sentence.
Bruck's lingering-doubt argument on behalf of Paul Mazzell
provides an apt example. At Mazzell's guilt trial, the chief government
190. Case Example: Presenting a Theme Throughout the Case, S. CTR. FOR HUMAN
(stating jury in Brooks case deliberated for a day before returning a "verdict of
guilty of malice murder").
RIGHTS 9

191. Id. at 23.
192. Bruck Interview, supra note 125.
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witness was Danny Hogg, who testified under a grant of immunity that
he and another man obeyed Mazzell's orders to bring the victim to
Mazzell and that Mazzell alone killed the victim. Hogg's testimony
was impeached by his past criminal record, his own admission that he
had given false testimony at an earlier trial, and his admission that his
grant of immunity would be revoked if the government concluded that
he himself had killed the victim.193 Three witnesses testified that Hogg
had in fact killed the victim and the prosecutor acknowledged to the
jury that Hogg was not a believable witness.194 The jury nevertheless
convicted Mazzell of capital murder.
At the penalty trial, Bruck began his lingering-doubt argument as
follows:
I want to preface this by saying again that what I'm about to say is not to
quarrel with your verdict or say you made a mistake. You took the

evidence as it existed in the courtroom during the past week or two; and

you, consistent with your oath, applied your good j udgment to that

evidence, and you found beyond a reasonable doubt that Paul was guilty.
And I'm not going to quarrel with that in any way, shape or form.

Bruck then moved to the question of how the jury should approach
the evidence in deciding the question before it at the penalty stage:
The evidence presented to you, as it had been pulled together by the
State over the last week or two, was guilty; but before you can put this
man to death based on that evidence you have to be sure of a fourth
thing beyond a reasonable doubt, and that is that the evidence that was

given to you and that you had to make do with as it had been pulled
together and hammered into shape by the time you had to deliberate,
that that evidence will never, never change. And you have to be sure of
that beyond a reasonable doubt. Y'all know exactly what I'm talking

about.

You have to be sure beyond a .reasonable doubt that Mr. Hogg won't

come up next month, next week, ten years from now, long after Paul has

been executed and buried and, for whatever reasons of his own, his
interests having changed, he's not going to come along and say: "Well,
I'm kind of embarrassed to say this now, but I didn't tell the truth at the
trial. " You have to be sure of that because, if Paul was still doing his life
sentence in prison and Mr. Hogg happened to say that, something can be

done about it; but if he's executed, it can't. 195

Michael Burt asserts that the argument that evidence of the
defendant's guilt "may change" has more resonance today than it did
in the past because of jurors' awareness of cases in which convicted
defendants have been exonerated. In order to draw on this awareness,
193. State v. Merriman, 337 S.E.2d 218, 227 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
194. Id.
195. Record at 1993, State v. Merriman, 337 S.E.2d 218, 227 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (No.
0444) [hereinafter Merriman Record].
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a capital-defense attorney may begin by telling the jury that she
respects its verdict, but in reaching the judgment that an individual is
guilty of a crime "we are dealing with human institutions that we know
are fallible. " 196 The attorney may then refer to cases in which
defendants convicted of crimes were later exonerated and state that in
those cases the government's evidence seemed to establish the
defendants' guilt and the juries that convicted those defendants were
convinced that their verdicts were correct.197
In some cases, the attorney will seek to draw even closer parallels
between the present case and prior wrongful convictions. When the
prosecution's case has obvious weaknesses, Bruck will tell the jury that
in cases in which convicted defendants were later exonerated there
were "always warning signs."198 He will then explain some of the types
of evidence that constitute warning signs - government witnesses
who change their stories, for example, or disputed forensic evidence
- and show that those same warning signs are present in the case
before them. 199
In arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury, an experienced
capital-defense attorney will often assert that the jury should not
impose the death penalty unless they find that the government's
evidence meets a higher standard of proof than the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard that governed their deliberations at the
guilt stage. Michael Burt states that in California, a capital defendant's
attorney will sometimes begin orienting jurors as to the differing
standards of proof at the voir dire stage.200 The attorney may even use
one or more diagrams to illustrate the different standards of proof
required at different stages of the proceedings, including, perhaps,
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, probable cause to arrest
him, proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him of the capital
offense, and proof beyond any doubt to sentence him to death.201
After the defendant has been convicted of the capital offense, the
attorney at the penalty trial will then refer to the earlier schematic
presentation and remind the jury that they should not impose the
death penalty unless the evidence of guilt meets the most stringent
standard. In some California cases, this argument will be especially
effective because the trial judge's lingering-doubt instructions will
reinforce the attorney's argument that the prosecution's evidence of

196. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
197. Bruck Interview, supra note 125; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
198. Bruck Interview, supra note 125.
199. Id.
200. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
201. Id.

August 2004]

A Deadly Dilemma

2041

guilt should be required to meet a higher standard of proof at the
penalty stage.202
Even when they expect no help from the judge's instructions,203
however, experienced capital-defense attorneys will still sometimes
argue that the jury should apply a higher standard of proof before
imposing a death sentence. Even if the j udge sustains a prosecutor's
objection to this argument, the defense may still benefit. The objection
will call the jury's attention to the issue of lingering doubt and perhaps
signal to them that the prosecutor does not believe that his case has
been proved beyond any doubt. The prosecutor's objection, moreover,
may give the defense attorney an opportunity to reinforce to the jury
the message that it has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether
the death penalty should be imposed.

202. See, e.g. , People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 386 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a jury
instruction on lingering doubt may be required by statute if warranted by the evidence). But
see People v. Medina, 906 P.2d 2, 29 (Cal. 1995) (holding that jury may consider lingering
doubts in penalty phase, but there is no federal or state constitutional right to a jury
instruction). In some California cases, judges have instructed the penalty jury as follows:
Although proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been found, you may demand a
greater degree of certainty for the imposition of the death penalty. The adjudication of guilt
is not infallible and any lingering doubt you entertain on the question of guilt may be
considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty, including the possibility that at
some time in the future, facts may come to light that have not yet been discovered.
People v. Snow, 65 P.3d 749, 799 (Cal. 2003).
Alternatively, counsel may request a special separate instruction, such as the following
instruction requested in the case of People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990):
Each individual juror may consider as a mitigating factor residual or lingering doubt as to
whether defendant intentionally killed the victim. Lingering or residual doubt is defined as
the state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubts.
Thus if any individual juror has a lingering or residual doubt about whether the defendant
intentionally killed the victim, he or she must consider this as a mitigating factor and assign
to it the weight you deem appropriate.
Email from Michael Burt (Mar. 26, 2003) (hereinafter Burt email] (source on file with
author).
203. In most jurisdictions, the judge will not instruct the penalty jury that its lingering
doubt as to the defendant's guilt may be considered as a mitigating circumstance. See
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988); Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1 140, 1 163
(Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1 1 46 (2004); State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074, 1116 (N.J.
2002); Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 38 (Ky. 1998); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d
307, 326 (Miss. 1997); Evans v. State, 926 P.2d 265, 284 (Nev. 1996); State v. Gamer, 656
N.E.2d 623, 632 (Ohio 1995); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308, 1328 (Or. 1992); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196, 211
(Va. 1991); Ruiz v. State, 772 S.W.2d 297 (Ark. 1989); Melson v. State, 775 So. 2d 857, 898
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999), affd, 775 So. 2d 904 (2000); Bemay v. State, 989 P.2d 998, 1012
(Okla. Crim. App. 1999). Courts that have considered the question have generally held (or
stated in dicta) that a capital defendant is not entitled to have the judge charge the penalty
jury that its lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt may be considered as mitigating
evidence. See Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174 (dicta); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 354 (Miss.
1997); People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); State v. Fletcher, 555
S.E.2d 534, 544 (N.C. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 846 (2002); State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d
1 1 12, 1 122-23 (Ohio 1997).
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In the Mazze[ case, for example, after pointing out to the jury that
it was possible that the chief government witness might later change
his story,204 Bruck added that he didn't know whether that would
happen. He next addressed the level of proof the j ury should require
to sentence the defendant to death and the prosecutor objected:
Mr. Bruck: But before you put a man to death on their
testimony, you have to be sure beyond all doubt
that it will never happen. And that's ridiculous.
Who can be sure of that beyond all doubt?
Mr. Stoney:Your honor, I object. The law is not all doubt. It's
a reasonable doubt, you Honor.
The Court: Reasonable doubt, Mr. Bruck.
Mr. Bruck: Yes, sir. The amount of doubt that you feel you're
willing to tolerate before you put a man to death, of
course, is between you and your own conscience.
And I won't go into that anymore.205
Bruck, however, did further refer to the subject of the standard of
proof. After talking about mistakes that have been made in the court
system, he emphatically stated, "The death penalty is for cases where
there can't have been any kind of mistake, and this is just not such a
case."206 After explaining why Mazzell's case was not one in which
there could not have been a mistake, Bruck adverted to the
prosecutor's earlier objection, using it to emphasize the jury's
responsibility for determining whether a death sentence should be
imposed:
Mr. Stoney jumps up and objects and says: "Well, its not beyond all
doubt. Its just beyond a reasonable doubt." Well, that's fine for him to

say, and that's fine for the law to say; but the responsibility for whether
Paul Mazzell lives or dies is not on Mr. Stoney. It's not even on Judge
Fields. It's on each individual one of you.207

Through this argument, Bruck effectively communicated to the jury
the reasons why it would be appropriate for them to decline to impose
the death penalty unless the prosecutor established the defendant's
guilt beyond any doubt.

2.

Two Penalty- Trial A rguments

Excerpts from two penalty-trial arguments provide a fuller picture
of the strategic choices skilled defense attorneys make when
204. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
205. Merriman Record, supra note 195, at 1993-94 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 1995.
207. Id. at 1996.
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presenting a lingering-doubt argument. In particular, the arguments in
these two cases - one from California and one from New York illustrate the ways in which different attorneys direct the jury's
attention to the issue of lingering doubt, interweave arguments
relating to lingering doubt with arguments based on mitigating
evidence, and highlight the importance of humanizing the defendant
so that the jury will have a reason to spare his life.

The Henderson Case
Philip Henderson was convicted of capital murder in California, a
state that allows the consideration of lingering doubt as a mitigating
factor.208 Henderson, represented by Michael Burt and James Pagano,
was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of
auto theft.209 Ray and Anita Boggs, their one-year-old child, Ray, Jr.,
and Anita Boggs's unborn fetus210 were found dead on or about
February 28, 1982, in the area underneath their apartment (which was
on stilts) and in the backyard of the apartment building. Ray had been
shot to death and Anita had been strangled.211 The Boggs family had
been killed about six weeks earlier, during the second week of January
1982, and items belonging to them had been taken from their
apartment at the time of their death.212
The police investigating the case determined that Philip
Henderson and his wife, Velma, had stayed at the Boggs's apartment
in January 1982. When contacted by the police, Henderson told them
he and his wife had last seen the Boggses on January 11, the day on
which the Hendersons left San Francisco to go to Florida. Henderson
did not tell the police that he had taken Boggs's property or that he
had noticed anything unusual in the apartment before he and his wife
left for Florida.
The police then discovered that Henderson and his wife had sold
property that belonged to Ray Boggs during their trip to Florida.213 In
addition, witnesses noticed that Henderson had in his possession a .22
caliber long rifle similar to a rifle belonging to Boggs.214 A criminalist
testified that the bullet retrieved from Ray Boggs's brain was fired

208. See text accompanying note 241 infra.
209. People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
210. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (Deering 2003) (making the premeditated killing
of either a living person or an unborn fetus first-degree murder).
211. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41 .
212. Id.
213. Id. at 842.
214. Id. at 842-43. One of these witnesses also testified that Henderson told him that he
and his wife were "on the run." Id. at 843.
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from a .22 caliber long rifle. While the expert could not positively
identify the rifle possessed by Henderson as the one that had fired the
bullet, he testified that the identifying characteristics of a bullet fired
from that gun were "consistent with the characteristics found on the
bullet which killed Ray Boggs. "215
Henderson testified in his own defense. He denied the murders but
admitted that he and his wife stole Boggs's property on January 1 1 . He
testified that Boggs was involved in selling drugs and that on one
occasion he had been threatened by two men, including one called
" Hawaiian Jimmy," who beat Boggs on the head with a cane. He
testified that he and his wife decided to leave for Florida because they
were frightened by Boggs's drug business and the violence that
accompanied it.
Henderson claimed that on January 1 1 he and his wife had helped
Ray Boggs look for Boggs's wife, who was missing. When they
returned to the Boggs's apartment that evening, the apartment was in
disarray and Ray Boggs's rifle was off the rack and leaning against the
wall. The Hendersons became frightened by the circumstances and
decided this would be a good time to leave. Because they had little
money, "they decided to steal the Boggses' property. "216 Among other
things, they took Ray's rifle and truck. Later, Henderson sold some of
the stolen property. He admitted that he had initially lied to the police
about his activities because he did not want to be prosecuted for
stealing Boggs's property.
In order to rebut the defense's suggestion that people associated
with Boggs in selling drugs might have murdered him, Edward Ramos,
also known as "Hawaiian Jimmy," testified for the prosecution on
rebuttal. Ramos admitted threatening Boggs with physical injury
because Boggs owed him money for work he had done on Boggs's
truck; but he claimed that he never hit Boggs and that Boggs had paid
him at least part of the money he owed by giving him a $50 check on
January 7, 1982.217
After five or six days of deliberations, the jury found Henderson
guilty of two counts of capital murder and several lesser crimes.
Because the defense had presented a strong claim of innocence at the
guilt trial, Henderson's attorneys decided to present evidence and
argument relating to lingering doubt at the penalty trial.
During the penalty trial, the defense introduced evidence relating
to the defendant's innocence that had not been admitted and would
not have been admissible during the guilt trial. Most significantly,

215. Id.
216. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
217. Id. He also testified that "[a] few weeks later" he attempted "to collect the rest of
the money [Boggs] owed." Id.
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Rose Marie Hunt testified. She was a close friend of the Boggses and
the godmother to the Boggses' one-year-old child and she also knew
the Hendersons as well as other people associated with both families
during the period when the murders occurred. She opined that Mr.
Henderson should be given a life sentence because "there's other
parties involved in this that hasn't been brought forth."218 Asked to
explain, she broke down in tears and testified from her wheelchair:
I believe that if he's executed in the gas chamber he may be executed as

an innocent victim . And I believe at that time when the true people have

(been) found out, there will be no way to bring him back to life like there

is no way to bring my friends back to life. I believe that if he is put to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole, that if he is guilty, then he's
punished. If he is not guilty, he has the possibility of coming out and the
real people being convicted.219

Other witnesses who knew Henderson also testified that in their
opinions Henderson was not guilty of the killings that had been
committed.220
During his closing argument at the penalty trial, the prosecutor
specifically addressed the issue of lingering doubt. He first referred to
the testimony of the witnesses who expressed the opinion that
Henderson was not guilty. He argued that these witnesses lacked the
knowledge necessary for an informed opinion. He pointed out that
some of the witnesses could not assess the defendant's propensities at
the time of the crime because they had not seen him for many years.221
In the case of Ms. Hunt, he emphasized that she had not attended the
guilt trial. He then said: "She didn't listen to the evidence. She didn't
consider that evidence. That's like someone being a Monday morning
quarterback who didn't even watch the game the day before. I object
to that. I think that's real inappropriate."222
After thus seeking to dismiss the testimony of the defense's
lingering-doubt witnesses, the prosecutor argued that the jury's verdict
at the guilt stage should preclude the defense from establishing
lingering doubt as a mitigating factor:
Now, if there is a doubt in your mind, I like to think - I like to think that
you'll resolve that in the guilt phase. And I think you did on certain of
the offenses. I think you gave the defendant every benefit of every doubt
that he was ever able to get. . . . But I submit to you any doubt was

218. Record at 6955, People v. Henderson, 275 Cal.Rptr. 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (Nos.
A036286 & A036290) [hereinafter Henderson Record).
219. Id. at 6957.
220. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
221. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7152 (referring to witnesses basing their
opinion on "someone they knew ten years ago, 15 years ago, 19 years ago in the case of Mr.
Comorato [who) knew the defendant when he was ten years old").
222 Id. at 7153.
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resolved in that jury room in the guilt phase. And I'll submit to you that
it's rather, it's rather a strong word, and I apologize, but it's rather
insulting to get up here and say may be you were wrong, just may be you
were a tiny bit. 223

Consistent with the empirical data relating to capital jurors'
attitudes,224 the prosecutor's assertion that defense counsel's lingering
doubt argument was "insulting" seemed designed to lead the jury to
weigh that argument against the defendant because it represented a
refusal on the part of the defense to accept the jury's verdict.225
The prosecutor's primary argument, however, was that the jurors
should view their verdict at the guilt stage as foreclosing any doubts as
to the defendant's guilt. After characterizing the lingering-doubt
argument as insulting, the prosecutor returned to this theme:
People have to make decisions. If we never made decisions, we would
never move. Some of you in occupations make decisions, life and death
decisions on a daily basis. You have to make decisions. You made your
decision, let's go with it now. If you are going to return a verdict of life
without possibility of parole, I hope you do it for other than lingering
doubt. I think that is selling yourself short. That is a cop out.226

The prosecutor thus continually sought to reinforce the idea that,
through its verdict at the guilt stage, the jury had resolved all doubts
against the defendant.
Defense counsel James Pagano, who had not participated in the
guilt trial but was the primary attorney during the penalty trial,227
made the final argument to the penalty jury.228 Early in the argument,
Pagano referred to the jurors' lengthy deliberations, observing that it
showed they were "serious about [their] job."229 A little later, he
specifically responded to the prosecutor's argument relating to
lingering doubt, emphasizing that a higher standard of proof should be
required to impose the death penalty:
And in spite of what counsel said, lingering doubt is very valid here
especially in the facts and circumstances of this case. . . . You can find
somebody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we explained that to you in
the voir dire. There is that higher area, just that little bit more. And they
allow you because this is the death penalty case.230

223. Id. at 7154.
224. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
226. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7154-55.
227. Burt email, supra note 202.
228. In California, the defense always has the opportunity to make the final penalty-trial
argument in a capital case. Id.
229. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7171.
230. Id. at 7173.
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Consistent with David Bruck's approach,231 Pagano next asked the jury
to visualize how the case might look to them in the future:
And you can say yes, I believe I found this is the guy, that did it beyond a
reasonable doubt, but would you five years from now, ten years from
now, 20 years from now, this is the guy that did it, he really did it.232

Having developed the framework for arguing lingering doubt,
Pagano proceeded to argue that specific aspects of the case "cried
[out] for lingering doubt."233 He argued, for example, that the jury
should give weight to Rose Marie Hunt's opinion: " [N]obody knows
the cast of characters that hung out at 753 Webster Street or that other
milieu down at Jack In The Box better than Rose Marie Hunt. And
the child's godmother is telling you you may have the wrong person
here, better give it some attention."234 He also argued that, in view of
the circumstantial nature of the government's case, the j ury should
give weight to the witnesses who testified as to Henderson's
nonviolent character: "There is no smoking gun here . . . it is
circumstantial evidence. Mr. Henderson was on trial. It was
reasonable for you to conclude, perhaps, what you did. But now in the
penalty phase you've got to know a little bit more about Phil
Henderson. "235
During the rest of his argument, Pagano talked primarily about the
defense witnesses who had testified on Henderson's behalf at the
penalty trial. Since this testimony could accurately be characterized as
good-guy evidence,236 Pagano was able to effectively interweave two
interrelated arguments: the witnesses' testimony showed that
Henderson's was "a life worth sparing" and that " [t]here [was] a
lingering doubt" as to his guilt.237
During the latter part of his argument, Pagano focused primarily
on the penalty-trial evidence relating to Henderson's background and
character. He talked about Henderson's life, including the people who
cared about him, his nonviolent character, and his kindness to
children.238 Through this argument, Pagano sought to humanize
Henderson and to convince the jury that his life was worth sparing.
Pagano also referred to testimony that indicated Henderson would not

231. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
232. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7173.
233. Id. at 7174.
234. Id.; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
235. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7177.
236. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
237. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7172-85.
238. Id. at 7186-92.
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be a threat to anyone if he were incarcerated for life.239 He ended by
urging the j ury to accept the alternative of life imprisonment.240
In accordance with California law, the judge instructed the jury
that, in deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death,
one of the mitigating factors they could consider was "any lingering
doubt you may have about his guilt."241 After a relatively short
deliberation, the jury returned a sentence of life without possibility of
parole.242

The Mcintosh Case
The penalty trial of Dalkeith Mcintosh, who was convicted of
capital murder in New York, is noteworthy for at least two reasons.
First, the defense counsel's lingering-doubt argument was unorthodox
but highly effective, thus demonstrating that skilled capital-defense
attorneys will adopt different approaches depending on myriad
circumstances, including the attorney's sense of the rapport she has
been able to establish with the jury. Second, the case provides a
striking example of the axiom that, whether or not there is an issue of
lingering doubt, mitigating evidence explaining the defendant's
background and history must be presented to the penalty jury.
Mcintosh was charged with two murders and felonious assault. The
prosecution claimed that he shot his estranged wife, who was a
corrections officer, one of her daughters, and her six-year-old
grandson. The two women died but the six-year-old survived and
testified against Mcintosh. Mcintosh had previously been charged
with assault in a domestic incident involving his estranged wife; the
prosecution's theory was that Mcintosh killed his wife to prevent her
from testifying against him in the assault case and then shot the others
because they witnessed him murder his wife.243 Mcintosh also had
several other prior convictions, including at least one for assault and
battery and some for marijuana offenses.244
The shootings took place on a secluded street in a sparsely
populated area just outside Poughkeepsie, New York. At the time of
the shooting, the three victims were in a "Volkswagen bug," which was
stopped in the middle of the street. A motorist driving in the opposite
direction arrived just as the shooter, a black male, fled into a wooded
area on the large grounds of a closed state psychiatric hospital. Police

239. Id. at 7188.
240. Id. at 7194.
241. Id. at 7205.
242. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
243. Email from Russell Stetler (July 3, 2003) (on file with author).
244. Stetler Interview, supra note 137.
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responded quickly. About a half hour later, an officer on the opposite
side of the hospital grounds saw Mcintosh walking toward town
through a swamp. When he asked Mcintosh to stop, Mcintosh ran; the
pursuing officer eventually placed him under arrest.
The six-year-old witness identified Mcintosh as the shooter.
Mcintosh's principal trial attorney, William Tendy, argued that this
child, who had a long history of mental and emotional disorders, was
highly vulnerable to suggestion and that the circumstances under
which he identified Mcintosh made the identification unreliable. To
support the child's identification, the government also presented
evidence that, more than a year after the crime, an environmental
clean-up crew clearing the swamp where Mcintosh was seen by the
police found a no-longer-operable handgun, and an FBI analyst
testified that the bullet lead in this handgun matched the lead in the
slugs that killed the victims. Since the swamp had been thoroughly
searched at the time of Mcintosh's arrest, Tendy vigorously attacked
the government's effort to establish a connection between Mcintosh
and the newly discovered murder weapon. At the conclusion of the
guilt trial, Mcintosh was convicted of four counts of capital murder.245
At the penalty trial, Tendy made both the opening statement and
closing argument to the jury. Early in his opening statement, he told
the jury he was "going to be honest with" them and "do things some
people told me not to do. "246 He then said,
I disagree with your verdict. I have to say that. I know I'm not supposed

to. I know it's not something you want to hear, but it's something I ' m

going to say. I have tried t o be a s honest with you a s I can. I hope you
respect that. I know you have been honest with us, especially with me,
and I respect that as well. So I accept the verdict. I have to. I'm no use to
this man if I don't. I accept it. I understand it, I respect it, but I disagree
with it.247

As Tendy indicated, his statement was contrary to the orthodox
view that the defendant's attorney should not risk antagonizing the
penalty jury by expressing disagreement with its verdict.248 By
emphasizing his "respect" for the jury and its verdict, however, Tendy

245. The jury convicted Mcintosh of intentionally murdering his estranged wife in the
same transaction in which he intentionally murdered her daughter and vice versa. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW§ 400.27(3) (Consol. 2003). The jury also convicted Mcintosh of intentionally
killing his estranged wife's daughter to prevent the daughter from testifying as a witness to
the murder of his estranged wife and of killing the daughter to prevent her from testifying
about the attempted murder of the estranged wife's grandson. See id.
246. Tendy's Opening Statement at 27, People of the State of New York v. Dalkeith
Mcintosh, State of New York, County Court, Dutchess County, Index #1996/4530
Superseding Indictment #146/96, Before Hon. George D. Marlow, County Court Judge
[hereinafter Tendy's Opening Statement].
247. Id. at 28.
248. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
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sought to deflect any hostile reaction to his statement. Since he had
already established a good rapport with the jury, moreover, his
openness and candor may have had the effect of enhancing rather than
diminishing the jury's confidence in him.
After some further comments relating to his disappointment with
the jury's verdict,249 Tendy stated that the purpose of the penalty trial
was "to decide if this man lives or dies."250 In explaining how the jury
should approach this decision, he referred to the fact that a juror's
lingering doubt could be a basis for voting against the death penalty.251
He also told the jury that the defense would present witnesses that
would enable them to "learn a little bit about this man. "252
Tendy then provided an overview of the defendant's life story and
alluded to the conflict between himself and the defendant with respect
to presenting this story to the jury:
It's a very, very sad story. He doesn't want it told. This man doesn't want
this story told, he doesn't want to hear it, and I have taken that decision
away from him. There's some painful memories here . . . . I think . . . that
his punishment really began the day that he was born and will continue
25
until the day he dies. 3

During the penalty trial, the defense presented witnesses who
developed the salient details of Mcintosh's sad story, which included
an impoverished childhood in Jamaica, horrendous child abuse, and
the defendant's struggles to overcome severe mental and physical
problems.
Some of this evidence was certainly "double-edged" in the sense
that it might lead the jury to believe that the defendant's prolonged
exposure to abuse would enhance his propensity toward violence,
thereby increasing both the j ury's confidence in its earlier guilty
verdict and its sense that, if Mcintosh's life was spared, he might be
dangerous in the future.254 Nevertheless, the defense presented
Mcintosh's tragic life story in graphic detail. In his final argument to
the jury Tendy emphasized some of the most horrendous aspects of
Mcintosh's history:

249. At Tendy's request, the judge asked the jury whether the fact that they had
rejected Tendy's arguments during the guilt stage would affect their ability to listen to his
arguments at the penalty stage. Tendy's Opening Statement, supra note 246, at 30. In
addition to explaining his feelings about the jury's verdict, Tendy in his opening statement
explained to the jury why he had asked this question. Id.
250. Id. at 31.
251. Id. at 32.
252. Id. at 34.
253. Id. at 35.
254. Introducing the evidence, moreover, opened up the possibility that the jury would
learn of Mcintosh's prior convictions, including his prior conviction for assault and battery.
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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This man was born to a mother who never wanted him and a father
who abandoned him . . . . All he ever knew was hatred and cruelty. That's
what he was raised on. He had a stutter so bad that he was afraid to
speak, and when he did everybody laughed at him, taunted him, and he
became so afraid that finally he shut down, stopped talking as a child . . . .
. . . And brutalized . . . beyond anything that I could ever imagine.
Whipped until he was cut and bleeding, whipped with sticks soaked in
salt water so when the cuts were there they would burn from the salt. . . .

This was a small child. This is mitigation.255

Later in his argument, Tendy reiterated that he did not "believe[]
[Mcintosh] committed these crimes."256 Nevertheless, he also made a
powerful statement explaining why Mcintosh's tragic history should
be relevant to the jury's sentencing decision. He told the jury that to
make that decision they needed "to walk in this man's footsteps."257 In
recounting those footsteps, he focused especially on the significance of
the brutal child abuse:
If your mother savagely beat you as a child, took out a whip and whipped
you with it until your skin bled, until your skin was cut and salt got into
the wound and made it burn, if she took a board and beat you with it,
took a pot and hit you with it until your head was bleeding, and she took
your head and slammed it against walls, and if she took a wooden board
with a nail in it and beat you while your flesh was being cut telling you

she wants you dead, tell me where you would all be right now? You want
to talk about a choice?258

In this part of the argument, Tendy's point seemed to be that the
abuse Mcintosh suffered impaired his capacity to govern his conduct,
thus reducing his culpability for any crimes he may have committed.
Although this argument - and the vivid description of the abuse that
supported it - could have had the potential for undercutting Tendy's
arguments based on lingering doubt, Tendy obviously believed that
that was a risk worth taking. In order to humanize Mcintosh, Tendy
presented the full history of Mcintosh's childhood so that the jury
would be able to see not only the man Dalkeith Mcintosh but "also . . .
that little boy."259
In charging the jury, the judge in Mcintosh's case said nothing
about "lingering doubt" but, in accordance with New York law, told
them that they could return a life sentence even if they found that the

255. Tendy's Summation in Penalty Trial at 28-31 , People v. Mcintosh (Dutchess
County Court) (No. 1996/4530) [hereinafter Tendy Summation].
256. Id. at 36.
257. Id. at 39.
258. Id. at 41-42.
259. Id. at 52.
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aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.260
After fairly short deliberations,261 the j ury returned with a life
sentence . 262
IV.

THE ST AND ARDS FOR EvALUATING STRATEGIC CHOICES BY

ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CAPITAL DEFENDANTS WITH A STRONG
CLAIM OF INNOCENCE

In this Part, I will address the three issues left unresolved by
Wiggins. Drawing from the material presented in Parts II and III, I
will seek to articulate axioms that govern the strategic choices of
experienced capital-defense attorneys when they are representing
capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. Based not only on
the material presented in these Parts but also on the ABA Guidelines,
lower court cases, and, to some extent, the implications of Wiggins
itself, I will contend that these axioms should also define the standard
of care that must be met by an attorney who is representing a capital
defendant with a strong claim of innocence.
A.

The A ttorney's Obligation to Investigate for Reasonably A vailable
Mitigating Evidence

In Wiggins, the Court placed its imprimatur on a provision of the
A BA Guidelines declaring that an attorney representing a capital
defendant has an obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available
mitigating evidence." In Wiggins, of course, it was obvious that the
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's social history was
"reasonably available" - not only in that it could be obtained but also
in that it could be obtained without placing an additional strain on the
other resources available to the defense for investigation.263 In other
situations, however, attorneys representing capital defendants with
strong claims of innocence may confront difficult choices relating to
resource allocation.
An attorney who believes the defense needs substantial resources
to support the defendant's claim of innocence, may also know from
experience that the judge who allocates resources for defense
investigation will not allocate sufficient resources to allow both what
the attorney considers necessary to prepare for the guilt trial and what
seems necessary to obtain the kind of in-depth social history of the
defendant that would produce powerful mitigating evidence. If the
260. Stetler Interview, supra note 137.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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judge has already granted the attorney substantial funds for
investigation that will support the defendant's alibi, for example, the
attorney may believe that the judge will not allocate funds for the
mental retardation expert that the defense attorney believes is
necessary to provide a meaningful analysis of the mitigating evidence
relating to the defendant's possible mental retardation. Or the
attorney may know that, given the resources already allocated to the
defense, the j udge will sharply limit the hourly rate to be paid to a
mental-health expert, thus rendering it impossible for the defense to
obtain the kind of mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's
mental impairment that a more skilled mental-health expert would be
able to provide. In these situations, what is the extent of the attorney's
obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating
evidence?"
When the resources available for a capital defendant's defense are
limited, the defendant's attorney must make difficult decisions relating
to resource allocation. The defense attorney's obligation to investigate
available mitigating evidence does not mean that she must curtail the
investigation relating to the guilt trial in order to fulfill this obligation.
The attorney may reasonably decide to obtain funds for a forensics
expert who she believes will enhance the defendant's chances at the
guilt stage, for example, even if she knows that once the judge has
authorized this expenditure, she will be unlikely to grant funds to
conduct an adequate investigation of the defendant's possible mental
impairment.
But even if the attorney's choices result in her not having the
resources necessary to conduct a full investigation of potentially
available mitigating evidence, she should make a record showing that
she has sought such an investigation.264 At a minimum, she should ask
the court to appoint a social worker (or other mitigation expert) who
can conduct a full investigation of the defendant's social history.
Depending on the circumstances, she should also request funds that
will allow an adequate investigation of the other areas that, as Wiggins
noted, the ABA Guidelines have identified as providing sources for
mitigating evidence.265 These include the defendant's "medical history,
educational history, employment and training history, . . . prior adult
and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural
influences."266 In some cases, for example, the attorney might be able
to show the need for a mental-health expert to conduct a meaningful
264. If the attorney believes allocating resources for the purpose of strengthening the
defendant's case at the guilt trial must be the defense's first priority, she will generally be
able to make that priority clear through presenting motions relating to these issues before
making motions designed to obtain a full investigation for mitigation.
265. Wiggins, 5 39 U.S. at 524.
266. Id. (citing 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 1 1.8.6).

Michigan Law Review

2054

[Vol. 102:2001

investigation of the defendant's medical background or an expert in a
specific culture to investigate the effect of religious or cultural
influences on his conduct.267
Through requesting these resources, the defense attorney would
make a record of the types of investigation she believed necessary to
present the "available" mitigating evidence. The attorney's request,
moreover, would alert the judge as to the extent and nature of
potentially mitigating evidence. If the judge denied some or all of the
attorney's request and the defendant subsequently received a death
sentence, the defense would be able to raise on appeal the question of
whether the capital defendant was provided with adequate resources
to present the available mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. In
some cases, the attorney would have a strong argument that, based on
Ake v. Oklahoma,268 the court's failure to provide adequate
compensation for the experts needed to assist the defense in obtaining
"any reasonably available mitigating evidence" violated the
defendant's right to due process.269 In all cases the attorney would
have fulfilled her obligation to seek such evidence. The scope of the
system's obligation to provide adequate resources for the necessary
investigation would be a question to be decided by the reviewing
courts.21°
B.

The A ttorney's Obligation to Investigate for Mitigating Evidence
When the Defendant Instructs Her Otherwise

The ABA Guidelines speak directly to the situation in which the
capital defendant instructs his attorney not to present mitigating
evidence at the penalty trial. In a sentence that appears immediately
before the portion of the Guidelines relied on in Wiggins, the 1 989
Guidelines provide, "The investigation for preparation of the
sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any initial
267. See, e.g. , Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding
counsel ineffective due to failure to conduct investigation that would have produced, inter
alia, expert testimony about the difficulty of adolescent immigrants from Hong Kong
assimilating to life in North America; this evidence would have humanized the defendant
and could have resulted in a life sentence, even though the defendant had been convicted of
thirteen murders).
268. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
269. See supra notes 107-108.
270. Wiggins appears to recognize that introducing "any available mitigating evidence"
will be a critical factor for the defense in many, if not most, capital cases. Whether Ake
requires compensation for the expert requested by the defense should thus depend on
whether the defense can make a sufficient showing that the expert is necessary to assist in
obtaining or evaluating such evidence. But cf The Supreme Court, 2002 Term - Leading
Cases, 1 1 7 HARV. L. REV. 226, 284-85 (2003) (arguing that though Wiggins implies
mitigation specialists "are not far outside the constitutional fold," courts have been reluctant
to hold Ake requires them "at nearly every turn").
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assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered."271 At least
as to a capital-defense attorney's obligation to investigate mitigating
evidence, the Wiggins majority appeared to accept the ABA
Guidelines as establishing "norms" for competent representation by
capital defendants' attorneys. Unless there is some basis for rejecting
the ABA Guidelines' statement that a capital-defense counsel has an
obligation to investigate despite her client's initial instructions to the
contrary, this portion of the Guidelines should also be viewed as
establishing the standard for competent performance in capital cases.
The strongest argument for rejecting this provision of the ABA
Guidelines is that it needlessly interferes with a capital defendant's
autonomy. As I have indicated,272 a capital defendant has the right to
make a binding decision as to what, if any, mitigating evidence will be
introduced at the penalty trial. Since the attorney must respect her
client's choice to have no mitigating evidence introduced at the
penalty trial, a reasonable argument exists that it would be competent
representation for her to comply with the client's direction not to
investigate mitigating evidence. After all, there will be no need to
investigate mitigating evidence if it has already been decided that
mitigating evidence will not be introduced at the penalty trial.273
The ABA Guidelines seem to be predicated on the view that,
unless the attorney conducts a full investigation of potential mitigating
evidence prior to trial, the defendant will not be able to make an
informed decision as to the sentencing strategy to be pursued at the
penalty trial.274 Lower courts addressing the attorney's constitutional
obligation to investigate mitigating evidence despite the defendant's
contrary instructions have focused on this issue.

271. 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 1 1 .4.l(c). In February 2003, the
American Bar Association updated these Guidelines to read "The investigation regarding
penalty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing
upon penalty is not to be collected or presented." 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 161,
Guideline 10.7.A.2.
272. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
273. As Michael Burt observed, however, investigation for evidence relating to the
defendant's social history will often reveal evidence that will strengthen the defendant's case
at the guilt trial. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Moreover, since defense counsel
cannot predict in advance what this investigation will produce, she will generally not be able
to assess the likelihood that it will yield such evidence. In most cases, the defense attorney
should thus be required to insist on at least some investigation for mitigating evidence in
order to prepare for the guilt trial in the capital case.
274. According to the 1989 Guidelines, an attorney must first investigate and "evaluate
the potential avenues of action and then advise the client on the merits of each." 1989
GUIDELINES supra note 55, Guideline 11.4.1 cmt. The most recent version of the Guidelines
states that "[ c]ounsel cannot reasonably advise a client about the merits of different courses
of action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the
client's competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has first conducted a thorough
investigation." 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 161, Guideline 10.7 cmt.
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Citing the ABA Guidelines' language, the Sixth Circuit has held
that a full investigation of mitigating evidence "should be conducted
regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to
be offered."275 Without citing the Guidelines, the Tenth Circuit
reached a similar result in a case in which a capital defendant's
attorney j ustified his failure to investigate for mitigating evidence by
asserting he was complying with his client's instructions.276 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that, unless the attorney investigated for mitigating
evidence, the defendant would have no "understanding of competing
mitigating strategies,"277 and thus would be unable to make an
informed decision as to the proper sentencing strategy. Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant would be unable to make
an informed choice because the attorney's "failure to investigate
clearly affected his ability to competently advise [his client] regarding
the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible
mitigating strategies. "278
Other cases have held, however, that an attorney may comply with
her client's directions to abandon investigation of mitigating evidence
so long as the attorney adequately advises the defendant regarding the
consequences of not investigating.279 The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has held that "a lawyer who abandons investigation into mitigating
evidence in a capital case . . . must at least have adequately informed
his client of the potential consequences of that decision and must be
assured that his client has made [an] 'informed and knowing'
judgment. "280 When the attorney apprises the defendant "of the

275. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 450 (6th Cir. 2001); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581,
596 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 11.4.l(c)).
276. See Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding defense
attorney's failure to investigate for mitigating evidence in compliance with his client's
instructions was ineffective assistance because it "affected his ability to competently advise
Battenfield regarding the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible
mitigation strategies") .
277. Coleman, 268 F.3d a t 447.
278. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229.
279. See, e.g. , Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
that a capital defendant's attorney's failure to investigate for mitigating evidence was
reasonable when the defendant informed him that no evidence should be presented at the
penalty trial and that, before accepting these instructions, the attorney "discussed the
purpose of mitigation evidence with [the defendant] and discussed what evidence could have
been presented"), affd, 306 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2001); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656
(Tenn. 1 998) (holding that a capital defendant's attorney's failure to investigate for
mitigating evidence was reasonable when the attorney followed the defendant's instructions
to neither investigate nor present mitigating evidence and the defendant remained firm in
his instructions even after the attorney informed him "about the importance of and the need
to investigate" for mitigating evidence); see also cases cited infra note 280.
280. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942
(2002); see also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the Silva
holding).
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importance of presenting mitigating evidence,"281 the court has
determined that the attorney acted reasonably in following the
defendant's decision not to investigate.282
But it is not clear that every capital defendant will be able to make
an informed decision relating to the investigation for mitigating
evidence even after the attorney fully explains the potential
significance of mitigating evidence? It might depend on the reasons
for the defendant's original instructions. A defendant who believes
locating mitigating evidence is unnecessary because he won't be
convicted of the capital offense obviously presents a different problem
than one who prefers a sentence of death over one of life
imprisonment. Arguably, the latter defendant is in a better position to
make an informed choice relating to sentencing strategy.283
Regardless of the defendant's reasons, however, the defendant will
generally be unable to make an informed decision with respect to
whether mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial
until after the attorney has conducted a full investigation. If a
defendant justifies his instructions on the view that the mitigating
evidence will be unhelpful in the guilt trial and will be unnecessary in
the penalty trial because he will achieve an acquittal, the attorney
should have ready responses. First, in the absence of data gleaned
from an investigation, nobody - including the defendant - can know
whether the investigation will produce helpful evidence. Second, the
outcomes in capital trials are always unpredictable. And if the
defendant argues that, even if the penalty phase proves necessary, the
investigation will produce nothing of value, the attorney should
reiterate that, absent the fruits of the investigation, the defendant
lacks the information necessary to determine whether it will produce
sufficient evidence to lead the penalty jury to spare his life.
Determining the scope of the attorney's obligation to investigate is
more difficult when the defendant purports to prefer execution over
life imprisonment or to prefer execution over subjecting his family and
friends to the aggravation of supplying mitigating evidence. If a
competent capital defendant makes an informed decision to seek
execution rather than life imprisonment at the penalty trial, the
defense attorney is required to respect that decision.284 If the

281. Hayes, 301 F.3d at 1068.
282. Id.
283. Even if a seemingly competent defendant expresses this preference, his attorney
must be alert to the possibility that the defendant may change his mind and that his choice is
made "without a full appreciation of the consequences." Bright email, supra note 107.
284. See, e.g. , Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998) . It should follow,
moreover, that the attorney should also be required to respect a defendant's informed
decision to opt for execution rather seeking a life sentence under circumstances that he
views as imposing intolerable burdens for either himself or his loved ones.

2058

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:2001

defendant's decision to opt for execution in the event of conviction
should be viewed as an informed decision as to the objective to be
pursued at the penalty trial, the attorney should thus be required to
respect that decision.
A defense attorney should not assume, however, that a capital
defendant's pretrial decision to opt for a death sentence at the penalty
trial, in the event it occurs, is a fully informed decision. When
confronted with a capital trial, a defendant, especially one who claims
he is innocent, will be much more likely to be focused on the guilt trial
at which he may be acquitted than on a penalty trial, which will take
place only if he is convicted of a capital offense. In most cases, it is
thus reasonable to assume that the defendant will not be able to make
an informed decision as to the objective to be pursued at the penalty
trial until the jury's verdict at the guilt trial forces him to confront the
reality of that trial.
In order to ensure that a capital defendant can make a fully
informed decision as to whether to seek a sentence of life
imprisonment or death at the penalty trial, the defendant's attorney
should thus provide the defendant with the opportunity to make his
final decision only after the verdict at the guilt stage forces the
defendant to focus on the stark, available sentencing alternatives. In
order to provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to make
a decision at this stage, however, the attorney would ordinarily have
had to conduct a full investigation for available mitigating evidence
prior to the guilt stage. Otherwise, if the defendant's final decision is
that he wants to seek a life sentence at the penalty trial, the attorney
will not ordinarily have sufficient time to find the mitigating evidence
that she would need to introduce in order to maximize the chances of
obtaining that objective.
Accordingly, if a capital defendant instructs his attorney prior to
trial either not to investigate or to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence, the attorney should nevertheless have an obligation to
investigate for all reasonably available mitigating evidence. Failure to
comply with this obligation, moreover, should constitute deficient
performance within the meaning of the first prong of the Strickland
test.
C.

The Attorney's Obligation to Make a Reasonable Strategic
Decision Relating to Potential Mitigating Evidence

Wiggins's analysis indicates that a defense attorney's strategic
decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence because she
wants to focus primarily or exclusively on reasserting the capital
defendant's innocence at the penalty trial must be subjected to
constitutional scrutiny. Justice O'Connor recognized that, prior to
conducting a full investigation for mitigating evidence, an attorney
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may not reasonably conclude that introducing such evidence would be
unnecessary or counter-productive simply because the argument based
on the defendant's innocence is so strong. Rather, her opinion
recognized that, when the potential mitigating evidence is persuasive
and not double-edged, combining the mitigating evidence with
evidence or argument relating to the defendant's innocence will likely
be a more effective sentencing strategy than relying solely on
reasserting the defendant's innocence.285
Through its citation to earlier cases,286 Wiggins indicates that a
capital defendant's attorney's decision to curtail investigation will be a
reasonable strategic choice if the attorney's preliminary investigation
justifies a conclusion that introducing the potentially available
mitigating evidence would be unhelpful or counter-productive. Under
what circumstances can an attorney representing a capital defendant
with a strong claim of innocence reasonably reach this conclusion?
More specifically, when may such an attorney reasonably conclude
that the investigation for mitigating evidence can be abandoned
because the evidence likely to be found will be double-edged in the
sense that it may convince the jury either that the defendant's guilt for
the offense of which he was convicted is more certain or his potential
danger to society is increased?
Based on Wiggins itself, a capital defendant's attorney cannot
reasonably conclude that introducing mitigating evidence relating to a
defendant's troubled childhood or severe mental problems would be
so double-edged that the attorney can curtail investigation for such
evidence. In discussing the Wiggins attorneys' sentencing strategy,
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the mitigating evidence available in
Wiggins did not show that Wiggins had previously engaged in violent
conduct.287 She thus concluded that the evidence "contained little of
the double edge"288 and intimated that introducing it at the penalty
trial would have been compatible with the strategy of reasserting the
defendant's innocence.
Although Wiggins thus suggests that a capital defendant's attorney
could make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for
mitigating evidence when the preliminary investigation reveals that
the defendant had engaged in prior violent conduct,289 the ABA

285. See supra notes 1 18-120 and accompanying text.
286. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986), and Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987)).
287. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536.
288. Id. at 535.
289. In addition to explaining that the mitigating evidence in Wiggins did not show prior
violent conduct, the Court also distinguished its holding in Darden v. Wainwright. In Darden,
the Court held that counsel can reasonably curtail investigation when "the decision to
present a mitigation case would . . . result[] in the jury hearing evidence that [the defendant]
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Guidelines do not provide that the attorney should abandon the
investigation for any such reason.290 And the material presented in
Parts II and III of this Article indicate that experienced capital
defense attorneys would certainly not curtail the investigation into a
defendant's background because of concerns that tracing his social
history would reveal that he engaged in violent or other anti-social
conduct.
In the Mcintosh case, for example, the defendant's attorney
certainly had reason to believe that, based on the defendant's
prolonged exposure to violence during his childhood, investigation of
his background might reveal that he had engaged in violent behavior
as an adult. In fact, the investigation of mitigation evidence showed
that the defendant had engaged in such conduct and had at least one
assault-and-battery conviction.291 Mcintosh's attorneys, however,
chose to present that mitigating evidence despite the possibility that
the jury would view Mcintosh as a more violent person. Introducing
evidence that would provide the jury with a full picture of the
defendant's troubled history was an indispensable aspect of their
sentencing strategy.
In fact, skilled capital-defense attorneys agree that, regardless of
whether the defendant has a strong claim of innocence at the guilt
trial, the defense attorney must present mitigating evidence relating to
the defendant's background at the penalty trial. If the defendant's
background includes prior violent conduct, obviously the attorney
does not want to emphasize this (or allow the prosecutor to emphasize
it) at the penalty trial. Nevertheless, an experienced capital-defense
attorney would be very unlikely to curtail an investigation for
mitigating evidence simply because she believes it would be likely to
uncover evidence showing the defendant has engaged in prior violent
conduct.
The investigation should be conducted because it may reveal other
mitigating evidence that can be introduced without exposing the jury
to the defendant's prior violent conduct.292 Moreover, even if no such

had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)). However, Wiggins's attorneys
"uncovered (nothing) in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right,
would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless."
525 (citing Darden
Id.

290. The A BA Guidelines state that "[u]nless a plea bargain has resulted in a guarantee
on the record that the death penalty will not be imposed, full preparation for a sentencing
trial must be made in every case." 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guidelines 11.8.1-11 .8.6
cmt (second emphasis added).
291. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
292. In some cases, for example, the defendant's attorney would be able to introduce
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's troubled childhood without opening the door
for the introduction of violent acts committed by the defendant when he was an adult.
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evidence is discovered, an experienced capital-defense attorney will
nearly always opt to introduce mitigating evidence that provides the
j ury with an opportunity to "walk in the defendant's footsteps,"293
regardless of whether it also exposes them to the defendant's prior
violent or antisocial conduct.294 As Stephen Bright said, if the attorney
does not "humanize" the defendant by presenting a nuanced narrative
of his past, the penalty jury will be likely to feel that it has no reason to
spare the defendant's life.295
While Wiggins did not hold that a defense attorney representing a
capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence can never make a
reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence, it indicated that the professional norms for capital-defense
attorneys are expressed in the ABA Guidelines, which in turn reflect
the practices of skilled and experienced capital-defense attorneys.
Based on these norms, an attorney representing a capital defendant
with a strong claim of innocence should almost never be able to make
a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence. Such a decision should nearly always constitute deficient
performance under the first prong of the Strickland test.
CONCLUSION
Even those who favor the death penalty believe that our system of
capital punishment should operate so that the risk of executing an
innocent person is minimized.296 Data showing that innocent
defendants have frequently been convicted and sentenced to death
have therefore provoked increasing public concem.297 When so many
innocent defendants have been and undoubtedly still are on death
row,298 it is almost inevitable that some will not be exonerated in time
to avoid execution. As Justice O'Connor stated in a speech given in

293. See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.
294. Michael Burt stated that he would not be concerned about introducing background
evidence that would expose the jury to the defendant's prior violent conduct unless it
"opened up the possibility of the prosecutor admitting aggravating circumstances, that would
be commensurate with the crime charged." Burt Interview, supra note 132. Thus, the
defense should be concerned if admitting mitigating evidence would allow the prosecution to
show the defendant had previously been involved in a murder or an attempted murder but
should not be concerned if the prosecutor could only be able to show that the defendant had
previously been involved in burglaries, assaults, or other charges significantly less serious
than the capital charge.
295. See supra text accompanying note 157.
296. See Welsh, supra note 149, at 981-82.
297. See, e.g. , infra note 299.
298. As of August 29, 2002, 12 of the 1 10 DNA-cleared cases were cases in which the
exonerated defendant was at one point sentenced to death. See http//innocenceproject.org/
case/index.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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2001, "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing
some innocent defendants to be executed."299
Unfortunately, the strategies employed by some attorneys who
represent capital defendants with strong claims of innocence may
exacerbate the extent to which innocent defendants are sentenced to
death. An attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong
claim of innocence who focuses primarily or exclusively on seeking to
obtain an acquittal at the guilt trial will inevitably find it difficult to
present an optimal penalty-phase defense and, as a result, will increase
the likelihood that the jury will sentence the defendant to death in the
event that they find him guilty of the capital offense. Although a jury's
lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt can be a strong factor in
producing a life sentence, defense attorneys are inclined to
overestimate the likelihood that the death-qualified jury that
convicted the defendant will in fact have a lingering doubt as to his
guilt. If the jury has no lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt and
the defense attorney introduces little or no mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial, the penalty jury will be likely to conclude that there is no
reason to spare the defendant's life. As a result, death penalties are
likely to be disproportionately imposed in cases in which the
defendants' attorneys believe the defendants have strong claims of
innocence - a pool of cases that includes many, if not most of those in
which the defendants are actually innocent.300
With respect to monitoring defense attorneys' representation of
capital defendants, the Court's decision in Wiggins is certainly a
positive development. Although Wiggins's holding could be confined
to the specific ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presented in that
case, the Court's analysis may have been animated, at least in part, by
its recognition of concerns relating to the administration of capital
punishment, including not only attorneys' inadequate representation
of capital defendants but also the risk of executing an innocent
defendant. If so, then the fact that Wiggins involved a defendant with
a strong claim of innocence may have been significant. The Court's
holding could provide at least a first step toward decreasing the
likelihood that defendants with strong claims of innocence will be

299. Marla Elena Baca, O'Connor Critical of Death Penalty: The First Female Supreme
Court Justice Spoke in Minneapolis to a Lawyer's Group, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.),
July 3, 2001, at A l , Al6.
300. In some cases involving defendants who are actually innocent, the evidence
presented at trial may appear to establish the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable
doubt. This may occur, for example, when the government introduces the defendant's false
confession into evidence and the defendant's attorney fails to present any persuasive reasons
for disbelieving the confession. For a description of one such case, see Eric M. Freedman,
Earl Washington 's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001) (describing the case of Earl
Washington, Jr., a mentally retarded defendant who was convicted and sentenced to death
on the basis of his false confession to the rape and murder of a young woman).
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sentenced to death, thereby reducing the risk that an innocent person
will be executed.
As I explained in Part II, Wiggins's holding could be limited in at
least three ways. First, an attorney's obligation to investigate for
available mitigating evidence could be defined so as to include only
the obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence that can be
obtained without placing a strain on existing resources. Second, an
attorney's obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence could be
limited to situations in which the attorney does not receive contrary
instructions from the defendant. Third, an attorney could be afforded
the right to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence on the basis of
a strategic decision when she perceives that the evidence likely to be
revealed will be double-edged in the sense that it is likely to conflict
with her claim that the defendant was innocent of the capital offense.
If Wiggins is to be interpreted in a way that will significantly
diminish the risk of sentencing innocent capital defendants to death,
none of these limitations should apply. As to the attorney's duty to
investigate for mitigating evidence, the ABA Guidelines, recognized
by Wiggins as articulating professional norms for capital-defense
attorneys, are clearly premised on the view that a defense attorney
must investigate for any reasonably available mitigating evidence in
every capital case. Even if she knows that the court will limit the
resources for defense investigation and believes that investigation
relating to the defense at the guilt trial is more important than
investigation for mitigating evidence, the attorney should file a motion
with the court requesting the appointment of an investigator who can
trace the defendant's background and social history. And, whenever
other investigators or experts appear necessary to seek and to render
meaningful the available mitigating evidence, the attorney should
request further funds.301
In accordance with the ABA Guidelines, a capital defendant's
attorney's obligation to investigate for all reasonably available
mitigating evidence should also apply regardless of the defendant's
contrary instructions. Interpreting the attorney's obligation in this way
will ensure that a capital defendant will be able to make an informed
decision as to the sentencing strategy to be adopted at the penalty
trial, if it occurs. Protecting a capital defendant's right to make an
informed choice as to this question is especially important, moreover,
when the defendant has a strong claim of innocence because, prior to
the guilt trial at which he hopes to be acquitted, such a defendant may
be unable to focus on the consequences of adopting a particular

301. In some cases, the motion would make it clear that the evidence found by the first
investigator will determine whether other experts need to be appointed.
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sentencing strategy at a penalty trial, which will only occur if his hopes
for acquittal are disappointed.
Finally, while Wiggins indicated that a capital defendant can make
a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating
evidence, the Court also appeared to recognize that the standard
against which such strategic choices must be measured should be one
that reflects the practices of skilled and experienced capital-defense
attorneys. Based on the practices of these attorneys, the following rule
should be adopted: an attorney representing a capital defendant with a
strong claim of innocence can never make a reasonable strategic
decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence simply because
she wants to emphasize the defendant's innocence at the penalty trial.
Even if the potentially available mitigating evidence appears likely to
be double-edged, the attorney representing such a defendant should
conduct a full investigation and, barring very unusual circumstances,
should introduce at least some of the mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial, if it occurs.
In Wiggins, the Court appeared to recognize that by 1989 the
norms of practice for capital-defense attorneys had evolved to the
point where the attorney ordinarily has the obligation to investigate
for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence." Through following
the provisions of the A BA Guidelines relating to searching for
mitigating evidence, capital-defense attorneys can reduce the
likelihood that innocent capital defendants will be sentenced to death.
And through applying Wiggins's holding in ways that reflect the
underlying rationale of these guidelines, courts can take a meaningful
step toward monitoring attorneys' performance in a way that will
reduce the risk of an innocent defendant's execution.

